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Congressman William Cohen (WSC) of Maine 
Jun~ 17, 1975 
Co'f~ol~~ lY\t<t ~ \d,~~ 
DFS - This is the first interview with Congressman William Cohen 
of Maine on Tuesday, June 17. Present were Messr1. Lynch, 
Mooney, Shea, and Congressman Cohen. We begin at ten min-
utes after 4 o'clock. 
WSC - I had just written an article for the Boston Globe dealing 
with the Bicentennial theme of •Allegiance to Whom•?, which 
I thought might be of some interest to you in terms of trying 
to write something in 6 or 700 words which point up some 
of the lessons an~ some of the morals of the experience of 
impeachment proceedings. 
I gave a speech at the National Jaycee's last February or 
March, which was inserted in the Record and I'll get that for 
you. 
Let's go back to the Saturday Night Massacre in terms of what 
the impact was and my relationship with Elliot Richardson whicn 
was key to me and our relationship after he left office., We 
lived close together and I gave him rides to work periodfcally 
and talked to him. He had an important role and influence 
upon me just from our discussions. After the Judiciary Com-
mittee · had passed a bill to -0reate an independent special . 
-. prosecutor, I wrote an article for the Washington Post about 
two days before it came out on the floor. They also wrote an 
editorial endorsing the article that I wrote, on why we 
~ '.·. shouldn't set . up legislation t~ create a new special prosecu-
tor. · Much of that came about as a result of a conversation 
that I had with Elliot, . just in ~erms of what the impact-what 
that would have o.nhJaworski and the proceedings at that stage. 
~That would probably be a starting point for me because when the 
article came out, the leadership took the bill off the floor. 
· Jaworski stayed on, I can get you a copy of that. David Brode? 
came up to me in the corridor and kind of fecetious1y saida •r 
just want to shake the hand of the man who singlehandedly re-
versed the editorial policy of the Washington Post• because up 
to tha:t point, they had endorsed the concept of a new indepen-
dent special prosecutor beyond the ability of the President to 
hire and fire from that position. 
DFS - Going back perhaps even three months before that when Drinan 
introduced his resolution on the Jlst of July •••• 
WSC - That was typical of him. 
DFS - Frankly what was your reaction? 
WSC - I had no reaction, I thought it was typical of him to do. He 
has always been kind of outu-ront on a number of issues, perhapE 
in- some cases proven to be right by subsequent events and this 
has proven to be one of them. But then I nad not given any 
consideration 
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WSC - and it had no credibility at that point in my thinking ••• I kn 
that he was a long time critic of the war, secret bombing of Cru 
bodia, 1mpoundment policies. I didn't really give it too much 
consideration, and I don't think it had any credibility at all, 
even within his own party or leadership until th~ massacre. 
That brief article on "Allegiance to 'Whom•? describes an inci-
dent which had a ~reat impact upon me - the evening of the dis-
closure of the 18t minute gap. We were sitting down and having 
dinner and Walter Cronkite was on in the other room. I turned 
to my oldest boy for some reason, I don't know why. _ I've never 
discussed Watergate with him. He is very bright and intelli-
gent and he is .in the Little League and reading spy novels and 
things. 
DFS -- -Is he the one who broke his arm? 
wsc - Yes, and asked him what he thought, and without any hesitation, 
__ he _said •1 think _he is lying.~ I looked across at my youngest 
son, who is very impressed with the White House and who has bee. 
to the White House and who did stand in tremendous awe. I was 
preparing~ lecture to Kevin about the need to presume inno-
cence and waiting until all the facts are in and not prejudging 
Before I could gett all of that out, (I was just putting my 
thoughts together and a little bit irritated at myself in not 
responding quicker than that-) he broke in and saida •nad, I 
wish we were living back in the days of Washington• which I 
thought was a terribly sophisticated statement for a ten-year 
old to make, and I couldn't respond to it, I couldn't say any-
thing. I was afraid that if I should say that things weren't 
all that great back then, that I might lose him forevers that 
I would c~nfirm the cynicism that was building up silently in 
a ten-year old boy and so that evening the meal ended in silenc 
Since that time I've tried to go back and reconstruct and re-
flect exactly why I was unable to respond at that time or didn' 
want to respond, I guess, and what the implications were of his 
statement going back -into yesteryear, in looking at cherry tree 
and --axes -and honesty and so forth. The fact -is that what was s 
1mp_orta.nt -~bo~t ·the event to me was that throughout -all this-
·process ·when I ·had thousands- and thousands · of letters_::-~coming 1n 
oal11ng me a traitor, a Judas Iscariot, and a riumber --of--other 
things that shou1d not go in print, that voice was still therea 
t he fact that the ten~year old boy had lost faith with the Pres 
and with the system. I don't know if we will ever recover him, 
but this was a · c-oneern to--me 0• What he did was to- remind me of 
the ·ideals that he saw in yesteryear. He had to go baok that -: 
far to find some one who stood· for honesty and I think lt gave 
me a ·great deal of support during a lot of the deliberations 
when there were temptations to buckle 1n and be one of the boys 
and conform my conduct to those of my colleagues on the Com-
mittee on the Republican side~ -- . 
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DFS - I think you we-re widely commented upon as the first Repub-
lican who leaned towards impeachment. Frankly, do you think 
it was Jus_tified and if so, how did you get into that par-
ticular image? 
WSC - Well, because initially the reaction on the part of the Re- · 
publicans was that this was an ideological war ar.i it was 
"them against us,• there was no basis in fact for the im-
peachment investigation1 that this was being used by the 
Democrats solely to embarrass the Republican President that 
they couldn't defeat, and they wanted to take away that which 
the electorate had given him. And I didn't see it as that, 
I guess it's because I don't have much of a political back-
ground. I don't like partisan politics. I have never been 
part of partisan politics, even when serving on the city 
council, as a mayor, a non-political position. And there 
didn't seem to be enough concentration of what's right _and 
what 1s really the truth. That they really didn't want to 
get' the truth. There was always kind of a tension on our part 
that they are out to get us and I did not feel that they were 
out to get us even though there were some hard-core parti-
sans. I don't think there 1s any question about it, but I 
found myself 1n a position thinking, should that prevent me 
from trying to do what I think is right? And I must admit 
that the firing of Richardson had a great impact upon me, 
because I don't think he would have resigned if he felt that 
Cox ha4 engaged in gross improprieties which would warrant 
his dismissal. Other aspects, I guess, from my own training 
in the law influenced me. I did a lot of prosecution, I 
knew how the defense worked, and I Just felt that during the 
course of the process that 1f we were really after the truth 
that it would come out and I would have no hesitancy to 
adopt procedures calculated to bring 1t out. I made that 
clear, I guess, initially when I supported Jenner. Rails-
back arid I were, - I think, his only defenders almost from 
the start. · He · got off t ·o a very bad start initially and al-
most before we got back from Christmas vacation he was in 
trouble with the Committee and I think that Railsback and 
myself were the only two who would consistently stand up 
and say that you know that these things have got to stay 
in and that what he is doing · is right. I think the other 
thing was the early vote on sending the subpoenas to the 
President when he didn't comply. The vote would have been 
a 19-19 split, and that was when I felt that I didn't 
really have much choice but to vote for it because I felt 
that many 1f not mostrgreed that the President had not in 
fact _..fully __ compl1ed. · Agatn most saw it as a political ploy 
and a -sett.irig up of the President for a future count or 
allegation of an impeachable offense and insisted that no 
Republ_ican should support that. There was a long conference 
that afternoon, I can't recall the date, was ft April, or 
March and I think most agreed that he had not compiled. I 
made a suggestion that I send my own letter to the Presi-
dent setting forth :fully why I don't think it's compliance. 
And they said no. Then I came.back to my office and wrote 
that letter any- · 
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way and submitted it that night. It went down to glori-
ous defeat, 27 to 11. And then I came to the ultimate 
choice of whether or not I felt that there had been com-
pliance and clearly it was no. I was disappointed· with 
my colleagues, frankly, when the vote came down - they 
saw fit to say no as rar as sending the letter and I 
didn't enjoy being in the position of being the taly one, 
but given the alternative of saying yes, he had complied 
in essence, I really didn't have that much choice. 
DFS - Another man has made the remark that Gerald Ford ·at his 
hearings for Vice President, had brought his life to the 
Committee, whereas Nixon had sent his lawyers. Do you think 
that's ~ justifiable dichot_omy? · 
WSC - Well, I wasn't all that pleased with the Ford hearings, 
quite -frankly. - I think,-· again -going back, -you want to 
know why I was always pegged as the odd one, go back to 
the -Ford conformation hearings. I really don't think the 
Republicans were interested in going into facts de~ling 
with the qualifications, because he was one of ours. They 
had known him, they were friendly to him and they had known 
him to be a good man and that was it. But, if you .go back 
and look through the records of the Ford confirmation, I 
think that you would be surprised at some of the questions 
being asked by our side and even on the other side. In 
fact, I was criticised by some of my colleagues for the type 
of quest1ons that I asked, and I can recall being rather 
tough on Gerald Ford in · some of the questions, especially 
over the notion of taping. We had a rather sharp exchange 
at one point. I can dig that out, I saved that portion 
· of the Ford confirmation where I was troubled about the · 
judge. I guess that ' was really the first real point of dis-
content on my part with · my colleagues. I was offended and 
outraged by the notion of setting up a meeting between a 
presiding judge on the case and offering him the director-
ship of the FBI. I .felt that was one of the most serious 
allegations, frankly, that had come out during this entire 
time and I wanted to know what Gerald Ford's attitude about 
that was. He initially passed it off lightly and said, 
"Well, I don't think it was actually an offer for promotion, 
I ·think it was a demotion.• I recall not being too satis-
fied with that. We had a restriction the first day, it was 
five minutes, and I didn't really have time to go into it 
with him, but on the second day, when we had ten minutes, I 
went back to that point. I said that I realized that he 
was just trying to inject some levity and I appreciated it, 
_ but- really wanted -to know what he felt of the ethics 1n - --
that situation. He said he was concerned about it, but he 
didn't feel that it amounted to that much, as I recall. I 
guess I used that opportunity to make a little speech about 
what I thought about it and 
~) .. 
Cohen - 5 
I know that Hutchinson was not too pleased with my remarks. 
I got some static on the floor for it. 
TM - To you, was it similar to a juror acknowledging that a 
position from the federal government had been offered to him? 
WSC - Yes, I felt that a judge approached in this way was wholly 
indefensible. I carried on like Faust, I can remember. I 
said Mr. Ford, you expressed some regret that the prosecu-
tion went awry because it obscured the fact that Ellsberg 
stole government documents and had them published. I ask 
you about Mr. Erlichman visiting Judge Burn twice, arranging 
meetings to discuss his possible appointment to the FBI 
directorship position. And one meeting in which the Presi-
dent dropped in to say hello. Could it be considere~ in your 
opinion, unethical or illegal tampering with the judicial 
process? I'm concerned with the ethics involved in talking 
with the presiding judge in the course of, perhaps, one of 
the ' major trials of this decade. Ford indicated, at the 
very least, there was a lack of discretion and perhaps poor 
judgment. And I said I would like to express my own reac-
tion to this, it's one of the most singularly destructive 
acts of the judicial pro~ess that I can think of because 
_I think it was ·calculated to influence the impartiality and 
neutrality of the presiding judge in one of the most his-
toric cases of the decade. It brought to mind another 
quote, John Mitchell's statement - watch what we do, not 
what we say •••• .. 
DFS ~ In other words, it illustrates two points1 your reaction to 
Ford's answer and also a.pother reason so early on you were 
looked upon as -
WSC - I guess ! _provoked some of the senior members of the Committee, 
on my side, perhaps, with that kind of question and did the 
same throughout the hearings on the Ford conformation. I 
took a rather aggressive role in questioning witnesses and 
because I felt that it was treated as sort of a proforma 
thing and no one was really giving that much thought to the 
historical implications of the 25th Amendment. We were not 
just dealing with Jerry Ford, whom they knew and loved, but 
what's the test we're going to use? 
DFS - McCall's magazine quotes your wife as saying you were •most• 
upset by the IRS evidence and by the Judge Byrne incident. 
Is that correct? 
WSC - Well, I had been involved in a case where - the prosecuting 
attorney had a unilateral meeting with the judge to . discuss 
an item and it went through three or four years of litiga-
tion and we finally secured a reversal at the circuit level, 
so perhaps I was a little bit more sensitive on that issue 
than some of the other members of the Committee. Others 
didn't see it as that. Chuck Wiggins, for example, 
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said •Bill, if you're right then no federal judge can ever 
be approached for a position within the government without 
being accused of compromising his position.• I think you 
draw distinctions when you consider the Ellsberg case with 
as much notoriety as that had. I wanted to see him prose-
cuted too1 he should have been prosecuted for taklng and 
revealing government secrets, but we · should do it within 
the letter of the law and the spirit of the law. So I 
wanted to see him prosecuted and I think that they inter-
rupted the judicial process. It was one of the abuses that 
I found so offensive and in fact, I had even suggested that 
we should call Judge Byrne in to find out why he went to 
visit Ehrlichman after the initial approach. 
TM - Okay, you do recall February and March of 1974, when the 
Committee staff, the White House and the Department or Jus-
tice staff issued reports on •what is a.n impeachable offense.• 
How and when did you arrive at what is an impeachable offense? 
Do you recall what that memorandum that circulated is? 
WSC - I recall. The first thing I . read was the -collected materials 
on impeachment. I read Benjamin Butler's definition and so 
forth, _ and rea! almost all the cases and commentaries Story, 
and everybody else. I think I became satisfied fairly early 
in the investigation that an impeachable offense was not 
confined to a criminal offense and I recall Jim Naughton 
came in . one day and said -What's your Committee doing,• and 
I said we are trying to de:fin·e an impeachable offense. There 
are those who argue it must be strictly construed and I gave 
him a very long esoteric discussion of the polar extremes 
and there are those in the middle and I added light-heartedly 
that perhaps it's like Frost said about love, •rt's inde-
finable but it's unmistakable,~ I'll know it when I see it. 
Well, the New York Times for consideration of space or out 
or malice, I'm not sure, cut ~off my long· dissertation and 
they quoted me as saying that impeachment was like love, 
it's indef1nable, but it's unmistakeable, and that was re-
printed in every p_aper. It got to be a joke. So I learned 
a good lesson from that, not to make statements of that 
nature. I think that earlier on after reading the selected 
materials in tha cases that I was open to be persuaded the 
other way. But I was personally satisfied that the meaning 
of impeachable offenses was not confined to statutory crimes. 
DFS - You say in your opening statement, quoting Somers in 1690, 
that it is extraordinary, something not lightly used. Do 
you consider it to be an integral part.of the check and 
balance system? Extraordinary but integral? 
WSC - Well, it's the ultimate waepon, it's the ultimate resort 
that Congress has·. It' the abuses become so great there 1s 
no alternative. I suppose an integral part, but it's like 
the nuclear reaction capability that we have. You don't 
_push that butto_n until: it-'s the ye_ry -· · · · -~ 
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end and I think that' s -· the way we approached 1t, with a kind 
of fear -that we · all had about what the implications were. 
-TM - In looking at this, is there a gegree of belief when it 
comes to a standard of proof, clear and convincing, beyond 
a reasonable doubt? 
WSC - Yeah, I came to clear and convincing as a test. I thought 
it had to be more than simply probable cause for the rea-
sons . that I said. 
DFS - Was that even... .be.i'ore Mr. St. Clari suggested that clear and 
convincing standard? · · · 
WSC - Yes, I was -prepared for it. I thought it different than a 
grand; jury situation, particularly in view of the fact that 
was being conducted partially in public. This really was to 
be differentiated from its 1t· had certain fac_ets of a grand 
jury invest1gat1.on,-. but ·by the very nature· of · everything 
being-publicized. in the news, it ·approached civilpropor-
tions-·and I thought in view · of the implications of what it 
means, you just don't lightly put · a President on trial 
based upon probable cause. It has to be somethitis more. 
The preponderance of the evidence would be the next test, 
I guess, but I went even further than that. · 
DFS - You have said that there were two standards of judgment, 
the facts and the Constitution. Well, let's pretend that 
you have the .facts and_you have the Constitution - now 
about it if the American people had not agreed? In 
other words, that it was simply not sellable, wasn't so 
believed? Is that a third standard of impeachment? 
WSC - Not to me it 1sn•t~ No, in fact I had fully prepared myself 
not to come back to Congress. I don't know what the result 
would have been had _the President not resigned and had this 
matter gone on or had I been asked to be a prosecutor. 
There was talk about that at the time. 
DFS - A manag~r in the Senate? 
WSC - A manager in the Senate, 1f there were to be a vote for im-
peachment. It had a violent reaction when that story came 
out back in my district. Saying it's not enough that he's 
a judge, now he wants to· be a prosecutor. And what I said 
was that I would have . to give it a very long serious con-
-s1derat1on -before- I - would ~ver agree to do something like 
t that. Many people dropped off the emphasis that I had placed 
on it. I didn't 
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really want to do it. And it was looking like I would 
really give serious consideration to being a manager. It 
was pretty bitter. 
DFS - Would you say that as a matter of fact between February, 
1974 and the first of August, did the facts prece~e the 
theory or did you come, however unspokenly, to a theory of 
impeachment before the facts? 
WSC - Well, first I started with the definition, in terms of do 
we confine ourselves to conduct which is criminal? That was 
really kind of an academic discussion. Because most of the 
allegations were criminal • . But at least I wanted to have 
a framework in which to deal with what I would be looking 
for in terms of factual patterns fitting into that defini-
tion, so I started first with the definition and what I 
thought it would entail. Within that rather vague context, 
we then tried to assess how do these factual patterns fit 
within that framework. I felt that I really never had much 
doubt about the secret bombing whether that amounted to an . 
impeachable offense, because I felt that there was Congress!on-
al complicity in it. Congress passed a resolution allowing 
it to continue for 45 days. I thought it would be ultimate 
hypocrisy to remove a President for an act which they con-
curred in substance. And similarly on impoundment, I felt 
that he had clearly exceeded his powers by impounding funds · 
and in dismantling offices, but I also felt that Congress 
contributed to the fact by continually overspending and I 
really wasn't about to vote for any impeachable act on some-
thing that Congress had some complicity in. So those are 
the areas that I could weed out rather easily • . The milk 
deal ,-- frankly, was one · that ·troubled me. -- It was even further 
complicated by :the fact that I had received a donation from 
one of the milk cooperatives1 I can't recall what the name 
is but we can get that. Gerald Ford was the one who helped 
arrange to get me a contribution of about $J,0001 I was in 
debt when I first got here. I recall talking with him one 
day on the floor and he said how are things going in Maine 
and I said fine, except that I owe an awful lot of money • . 
And if he could possibly arrange for me to go on speaking 
tours or doing anything whfch would generate money from 
those who normally contribute to a Republican candidate. 
I needed help. Then I saw him two or three weeks later and 
he saida "Bill has anyone stopped by to see you about con- . 
tributing something?" and I said, "No", and he said, "They 
will because I put you_ on a list of people who need support 
and shortly after that some people from the milk cooperatives 
came in. I didn't talk to them. I was going out on the floors 
f l ~ ~; . they sat and talked to my aide at the time and I got a $;,000 
- a short time after that - a matter of a couple of ~~ys -- I 
· received a call, it was from a Congressman, I didn't know 
who it was, it was in the first two months that I was 1n Con-
- gress and I didn't know all the members - it . was an intern 
talking the call from a Congressman and I picked it up and 
he said, "Hi, Bill, I understand you are interested in co-
sponsoring a bill to increase milk parity• and I said, "I 
don't know who you have been talking to but you have got the 
wrong man, the 
• J * 
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wrong guy. I have no intention in co-sponsoring anything." 
I hung up - I came up fuming at the thing. I went out 
and talked with my aide and said, "Did you have any con-
versation about this?" He said, "No." I just did a slow 
burn and I expected to hear back on it, that a complaint 
would be made, that here we contributed $3,000 to this 
man's campaign and he won't even support a measu~3 to co-
sponsor milk supports. I never did receive a call, it was 
just dropped. I filed disclosures or who contributed to 
my campaign and it never came up again until the Ford con-
firmation when there was a rumor that was being pursued 
by some reporters that Ford -had been kind of a bagman for 
the milk industry and I had received a call since I was 
one who had received a contribution and I invited them in 
and told them the exact story that I told you and so they 
started writing it up at that point and it proved out that 
he had not in fact been a bag man. He didn't intercede in 
any way, he just put me on the listi this guy needs help 
and that was the extent of it. 
I was concerned as an element pf _an impeachable offense ~s 
to whether or not they had in fact .increased the parity as 
a result of receiving the pledge of 2 million dollars or what-
ever it was, I was· concerned about the conservation between 
Connelly and the President. --· 
DFS - Would you mind, Congressman, in taking a look at number 4. 
Some of this may · have a rather uncomplimentary ring. When 
we say political, we don't necessarily mean political in the 
sense of being bought, but voting one's district or having 
a popular support, but you already answered that, you didn't 
vote as _you would think the people did but on facts and the 
Constitution.~ •• ? · 
WSC - Well, let's put it this way, the political situation was such, 
the Republicans were opposed to my position with very few 
exceptions, those people who had some trust in me as an at-
torney or how I had performed in office in terms of fairness. 
There weren't all that many. The volume of mail that I was 
getting after a while was such that I just stopped counting 
it. For a while there was just hundreds, thousands of let-
ters that came in and we were keeping a tally of how many 
for and how many against. And I just reached a point where 
.I stopped counting, I was satisfied that there were more 
opposed than for, I tried to go back and articulate the 
position without coming off as being arrogant and that I'm 
going to impose my own judgment and not take into consider-
ation yours. · I kept soliciting their views through my 
newsletter and my radio progranis and so forth. But I tried 
to ~e 1t clear that in the final analysis that I'm the only 
·one who -could- make -that judgment. I had promised them early 
that either just before I had reached my decision or just 
after I would .go back to the State and explain in some detail 
why I reached that conclusion. I felt that if I made the de-
·c1sion and I went back and I couldn't persuade them that 
I had done the reasonable and the right thing, then I .didn't 
deserve to s1t in Congress. 
. , 1' 
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DFS - You did that on a Sunday night, as I recall -
WSC - That's right, but I told them this early, months ahead or 
time and 1t was a continual process of going back, news 
interviews and programs, trying to explain to them that I 
would try to do the right thing. 
DFS - Your wife, recalled one of the less savory comments, "May 
a thousand camels relieve themselves in your drinking 
water." 
Laughter. 
WSC - Well, I'll tell you, the mail got so bad, that the staff 
stopped ~hewing it to me, it was so vicious and violent, 
anti-Semitic, it was obscene. I got my share of rocks 1n 
the mail. But it was really of a violent nature. I got 
one threatening call. There was an ugliness throughout 
the mail. _The staff used to tape some of the pungent letters 
and there was one of them which I thought rather compressed. 
a man's anger and outrage and it was a quote or a very few 
words. I got his message! - · 
DFS - How about the -various media, for example Time magazine or 
Newsweek or you name it? Did you read any of these consis-
tently do you think or did they have any effect on you or 
were they just for informational purposes? 
WSC - I didn't read them other than when they were quoting me. I 
couldn't move outside my door and my phone never stopped 
ringings there was always somebody wanting to know, what's 
happened _today. -What are you going to take up today? I 
had a pretty firm rule that I would be happy to discuss 
anything I could publicly. I would discuss moods, I would 
discuss my own perceptions of things, but I would not dis-
cuss anything before the Committee. I wouldn't reveal any 
information to them that was not a matter of public record. 
I had a very embarrassing experience, shortly after we com-
menced the hearings or the investigation. -- We got -these 
1 looseleaf volumes that John Doar was preparing. He used to have 
-, a summary in the front pa:rt, a plastic folder to set it apart 
so you will be able to take it out and close it down. I 
stuck ,the summary 1n the front part here and I was taking my 
books back to my office over in Longworth and I went through 
the door at the end of the meeting and I had five or six 
books and I was ,really struggling with them and there was a 
mob outside, and I just kind of pushed through and as I 
pushed through I felt something let go on my arm and I 
started to panic. I asked everyone to step back and I was 
really angry about it, and they all kind of got back and I 
looked ·around on the floor and I couldn't see anything so 
then I started to walk away and I said,- "No, I better go 
back," so I retraced my steps back to the Committee room 
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WSC - I said, \·.iell, it must be my m agi.nation. I went outside 2.r:d got in 
my car and drove over to Longv:orth from the Payhurn build Liq, 'f- ·went 
upstairs arrl started to take the materials out arrl I looked and the . 
entire middle section frcr:1 the first Sl.liiTilaIY of the second lx::ok ·was gone 
and I rernanber breaking out into a sweat at that !pint, sayi.11g ''My 
Gcx'l, you know sane:::me is going to pr int that," Itf didn't contain 
any confidential infonnation...,.blt;;ir,. because all statements ,;,,ould 
have a foornote 1, 2 or 3, 'Which were contained in the acb..lal tabs. 
The fact is that I was concerned alx:>ut vJas my own credibility. That 
I v.tmld be laceled as a leak,. that there v.DUld appear o~~front . 
pages and ·the very first or second night out that this . happen.4,~. 
I ran back to the COITl!l.ittee office and I got than to open it up re-
cause all the roans were lccked at that time. We looked all over 
the place and we oouldn 't find it. I didn ~ know what to really 
th.ink at the time. I really felt scrneone had stolen it, rut I wanted 
to dooble check without accusing anyone. I <Xlllldn~t find it, I · 
trie::1 to get ~ rold of Jenner. I didn't locate },Jrn that night un-
til arout 9 o'clcck. and I told hlm what had happened and so he called 
security and they went over and -they opened it up and they- s""LB.rt.ed the 
search and he got back to me about llo'clock, 11:30, 12, 12:15 they · 
'were still looking and he called. Ee had _called .Doar at tr.at point and 
apparently ha.d made a call to all the news media saying tr..at the rraterial. 
had been ta.1<en and they \-.:ould request that they not publicize anything 
that ha.d been taken. Well, . it never ~h::,wed up, w--eJ::anned everything 
for days, looking to see if there was any in:lication that saaeone had 
sane material, and it never sro,;ed up. I told Hutchinson the next 
morning the first tlring al:out it, Fbdino was informed arout it, I made 
a statement I guess the following ftay, but I was sorely _anl:::arassed 
to say the least. From that ,IX)int on, I refused to take my b:::oks out-
side. I left them at my des.le and had than put a"-t-;ay until the final 
weeks. I w-a.s so distraught al::out that wrole episode that I felt very . 
cynical ab:Jut the re,r:orters ~a:Y--that.. I just felt that a first 
class reporter v.DUld never have done SCJ11ethi.ng like that~ t:hat it kind · 
of soured me on the press. Let me get back to your original quest.ion, 
this is a little divergence fran it. The only thing I looke::l for fran 
the press is that if they C[UOted me_, I wanted to make sure that it w-as 
accurate - that t..'1ey v.DUld not take scrc,e tirings out of cxmtext. Aside 
from tha.t I didn't read t..lie long stories. 
DFS - Now the very fact that the press singled you out being the new first 
Republican to favor iJnpea.c!-rrent - did that have any particular .effect 
on yru? · 11 +-. -r+ __ _,__ ·.t M#r,c. .J,f'f•~ for,,~ .. -·wsc - Pell, sure, it had a'1 impact on me.AI found myself during the course 
of proceedings taking a P.1Uch rrore active role than rrost of t.11.e other 
.nanbers. WJ;zen~=-f-➔oclcxbaGl.-through the qµestio.os-J'lOtra, r ·was ~'t:?a~ 
disappointed with the c:ruality of the questions coming fran our side. 
If they are really interested in getting the truth, the&,\ they ought to 
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\'i'SC - a pro~tor when a witness didn't ring true then I usually \·Jent 
after a.:-~·,1:...- ~-Ji.th O'Brien, for exaI"f:?le, I th:)t.isht r.-e was lying. 
So-r_as Bittrran, in my opinion. But -/...&f..r.·:-ere kind::of constrai ..ed, 
y~ only got ~ five minutes and there ,-.,a,s one :EX)int during the ques-
ti,qning of O'Brien where my five minutes ran out and ilitler asked that 
Cdehn be allov.cl to proceed and Hutchinson said "no." The oru,y :i:;eason 
th:lt I got rrore time is that Trent \.ras outside either J'il:=!king•or.ao g~-
ting sanething and he came in and I said "Trent {I.Dtt) \·,a.ild'\10u yield 
me your time." and he h.ad no notion what was goinq on, and yielded 
me his time a,,-rl I pursued from that point on. And plus it was anbar-
rassing, I suppose, a little bit., that the manbers of t..~ Darocratic 
side were yielding their time to me. It's not always exactly a plus· 
in your favor. But I felt that there were questions t..hat had to be 
asl--...ed that v.>ere not being as.1<ed and I was going to ask t..1-ian regard-
less of what the other people th::mght arou£ it. And the other thing 
is, that knCMirg that you've been singled out creates counter pres-
sures. '!he counter pressures being that you know tlBt your questions 
carry less weight. Even th:mgh you may think t..'l1a.t -~ are getting at . 
delicate points that ought to l:e pursued, if they (ahve_a.1reaa.y dis- . 
missed you based up:m pr~ss rep;:>rts, saying "well, he's l::een singled 
out", then you :have the notion that no ID3.tter what the validity of 
your point, no . one is pa.YliB.1 ?ttention d~ your side. But I just 
never felt satisfied with ~questions being asked on cur side. 
Or even on the other side for that matter. Waldie, for example, . I 
th:mght, was always a very gcod . example• but-H: was so partisan that 
even I couldn't accept his questioning to really get at the truth, 
~ I knew th:it ¥s questions v.0uld l::e dismissed just like many times 
nune '\l,Ulld be · on my side. . u....,J . . _ 
h1SC - Let me try to clarify that I don' t,_J.eave the impression that my -
oolleagues were less roncerned ab:Jut searchiJ1i for the truth. That was 
my perception at the time, I think that I didn't fully appreciate in 
the past row partisanship had colored perhaps the debates and the per-
fo:nnance of the Camu.ttee. There ·was a very strong undercurrent of 
partisanship in Congress an::l a.ls:> in the Ccrrrnittee. I~ never had 
a::xne into oontact with it an::l therefore, it had never troubled me. 
There ·were definitely partisan. on the DEr..ocratic side, just as there 
were on our side. '!hey v-.'ere concerned al:out the truth but t..riey als::> 
had this feeling that samerow that if tJlis situation were reversed, and 
W~tbey had a Derrocratic President am. urrler si.r.iilar circunstances you 
v.UUJ.dn 't have the imr:;eachment resolution being heard by the Rodino 
Carmittee... 'l11.at was always underlying. 
DFS - I had one final question on the factors outside -of tl-.e Congress, 
arrl t..liat is your wife •••• 
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DFS - Would you care to comment on that? 
WSC - I th1nk that you should probably talk to her. 
DFS - We've been thinking of this. What's your 1dea, when we 
get to Hilton Head, of simply asking the seven wives with 
prior okays to have a group session - group or individual -
much shorter of course - What would your reaction be to 
that? 
WSC - I say fine. I don't like speaking for Diane. She is a 
small petite person with a backbone of steel. She watched 
all of the Watergate hearings and knew more of the factual 
informatJon • . I didn't watch any of the Watergate hearings 
but one night. I caught a portion when Krogh was testi-
fying. Maybe just a flash of Haldeman. I didn't pay any 
attention to- it -at -all,- where she -knew every detail backwards 
and forwards. She takes a very acute interest in national 
affairs and she reads about everything. She never tried 
to intervene but she is very strong. Even when the pressure 
got · really tough, she was always there to say, "You did- --
the right thing.• 
I 
DFS - Once the Doar e~idence began_ on the 9th of:., May, did you 
discuss the thing with her? 
WSC - I never discussed the evidence as such with her. I would 
discuss some of the pressures that were generated from day 
to day. She attended most of the hearings that were open 
to the public. But I don't recall ever discussing many 
details with her. One night, after the vote on sending 
a letter to the President, I went out to have a couple of 
drinks with Bails (Railsback). I was pretty angry, · frankly, . 
at being out on a limb by myself. I was angry in the sense 
that privately -they said that it wasn't compliance and when 
it came to the public vote, they voted no. I felt that they 
were putting me in a position of having been labeled a 
maverick and then · being forced to then confirm 11:·. And I 
was- angry with Rai_ls 1n particular?Oaughte!:7• I just had 
to get out of that room. The reporters kept running up and 
they wanted interviews and I said, "no, I don't want to talk 
with anybody.• So I ducked out the back door. I tried to 
go in the back door of the Longworth and the door was lacked. 
Joe Pritchard was outside and said, "Bill, I think that they 
are trying j:o tell you something... So, then I had to go aroun< 
up to the front 'door • . In the meantime I got back to my of-
__ fice, _ Rails had called up and said come on to the Hawk and 
Dove and he was there with a couple of staff people and Bill 
· Hermel 1n. - · · 
TM - Yes, I · was the~e, too.' 
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WSC - I was pretty down at the time and I think that I had two 
beers and he was having a good time, kind of needling me. 
I just finally ·got up and left and went home.- And I remember 
I got ' ·ba.ck about one o'clock, tiptoed up the s ta1rs and I 
guess I said, "I've just done the hardest thing in my whole 
career tonight.• "I know,• she said, "But it was the right 
thing.• I tried not to wake her up. That was a tough vote 
that night, as tough as the ultimate vote,~ think • . The 
President was saying, take it or leave it, on Monday night, 
all the material stacked up and there was always that party 
pressure and that peer pressure. It was the hardest thing 
to confront. People coming up during the course of the de-
bate on something and saying, I understand that you're out 
to get him - you are the one leading the ~harge against 
the President. And I said, "Why do you say that?•-, "Well, 
just because" and I said "You · mean because I'm- t ·rying to ask 
the right type of questions to get at the truth." · But it 
was always th.a> t notion of, well, here he comes and of · 
turning away. Isolation by the other Members. That was 
the most difficult point, I guess. 
SL~ Which of all the evidence did you consider the most helpful 
and the most convincing? 
WSC - The evidence assembled? I think the material dealing with 
the agency abuse, was the-most impressive. I wasn't at all 
impressed with our investigating efforts, I guess. The 
books were helpful in compiling everything, but I took the 
Watergate Committee materials and I related that, I read 
every one of those volumes. · Before each session I would go 
back the evening before and read over the testimony in . 
the Senate and then read what the Committee had done with 
its interrogation and then related it to the book. • I read 
"All the President's Men" twice, I think just to find out 
anything that might be different than what someone had .said 
in the Senate or something that we had, and had that all 
integrate·d. I don't know if I can point __ to any one thing 
that was that impressive. · 
SL - Did you talk with any members of the Judiciary Committee 
at all or the staff people that worked on it? 
WSC - I didn't even talk to a.ny members on our side - that was the 
strange thing about it. None of us really discussed this 
until the very end. 
.,. 
TM - At one point you did engage with some briefings with Cates? 
WSC - Yes, _at the very end. He came up to my house on a Sunday. 
I think that Diane was back in Maine with the boys. Ham Fish 
wanted to get together and we invited Cat~~• and we had two 
or three minority counsel there as well. 
-
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™ - Cates rcde his bicycle out there! 
(Laughter) 
i,iSC - I was impressed h~ with Cates on his presentation during trat 
long session; I wade notes tr.a.t day. I wa s i rrpressed witb. hlin going 
back to the initial coverup facet of it, what facts to look for and 
wha.t \-.as persuasive and what was not. I \ ·BS very ii.71pressed , with his 
organization of tr.at :rraterial. 
'IN - How i.mfortant were the tapes, in your opinion? 
WX - .. Oh., very _ ~¥,l.· ·_ .:.:.:-.:~~.'° :/ / ··· ···:·:.:,_:::-:_)· .-_,'.- · _; t=-t-> -~ . ,_.. 
DFS - Crucial? 
wsc - Crucial. 
SL - Could there have been a clear and convincing case built, having no 
tapes? 
WSC - I doubt it. Without the tapes you have no tran:scripts, right? With-
out the transcripts you were left with John Dean arrl the President. 
DFS - i in your opening statement tl,.at Thursday night, :you emphasized very, 
very Imlch the strength of circumstantial evidence. 
wsc Yes, well, I \\'a.S getting concerned with my colleagues on the floor 
saying~ what...the- hell are -you-guys doing over -there? -AU yod"got is 
circumstantial evidence. " The layman's definition of circunsfuntial 
ev.:i.dence is a bit different fran trat of a lawyers' arrl all I tried to 
p::>int out is ~t nost of .your cases are built upon circumstantial evi-
. dence, alrrost every criminal case. You rarely },..ave an eye wimess to 
the crime and you build it up::m solid inferences and circt.ii-nstantial 
evidence arrl finally trace it to the a_gcused. JYou rarely get that · 
eye witness. I-t~ust=-~ri.s ~ro~tin:3' criticisn by same of 
my colleagues, saying "what are you guys doing over there, you're tak-
ing so long, why don't you get this thing over with?" And of course, 
that was because of their concern that the lo~er~t this went on, 
the closer it came to election time, and v~~ery ·way they voted, 
they knew that they ~--ere going to damage than.selves with a certain part 
of the electorate arrl that th~y ,;..ould have that less time to repair 
the damage, ~-drave-tha=t;:-Iit~e--pushing. for 
a~ro~ And we 'MJUld say, ~--ell we r.a.ve got to take our tirre, 
we have really got to do a th:>rough job, we '\-.DI1 1 t be satisfied witlout 
tbat "'and then ~ criticisn came: from all - you've got only circum-
stan~ evidence. Of course, Chuck Wiggins is the one,I tli.ink i:l1a1.; 
wh::> was prorroting this. But what I tried to do is to say that, 1 yeah, 
we've got sane circumstantial evidence, rut circumstantial evidence 
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point out the e.v.ample of the Dean testirrony. As ~ i:.•;ent out the 
doors after listening to the ta:pes on Dean ·we~wer~ grabbed 
' . . __ T.c., ~C,(. .. , c..~ f by every rep:)rter, 'Did he say, ~ ::-e~, or god 
darrm it"? \mt was the expletive? The press was fcx::used on tne 
nab.rre of the expletive. Was it "goddamn-it" or was it ."Jesus 
Christ." And I think you had 38 different versions of i:.-;hat was 
@id, arrl that is just ~ an example of the traditional falla-
! 
cies involved in terms of eye-witness testirrony. The old exa:rrple . 
at Chicago University during the course .bf a lecb.1.re the professor proclu.c..~ 
br;ought a scene where someone was sh:xJting sorreone else arrl he asked 
them to recoun't exactly wr.at happened and he rad aJ..r::ost total diver-
sity. · 
DFS ..,. I ao· that every ~ spring.> -\{:-:,:<;.·:-.. · · I 
i•ISC - Of a:)Urse, tlose of us wh:::> were involved in trying cases, kn:)w that l 
reasonable people see different things an::iaso-ro.r-th, rut. sanetirres, you l 
get a piece of circumstantial evidence which is far rrore co~).usive. l 
T'ne srt:JW was one analogy that I tried to demonstrate tra.-t!~tn am. I ! 
found that the public reaction to thatieven with the peopie on-th.e- #&Tt-", ..._! 
floor, was overwhelming. "Gee, - I've never tlought arout that before, ! 
is t.liat what you mean by circuriistantia.l evidence?" j. 






.Mitchell -~ I didn't think was entirely forth::aning, I v.-ent up and 
talked to _l.T.i tchell during the course of his testimony, I had never 
met him before (I guess I didn't think that his statenents were quite 
as flagrant as some of the others:) O'Brien I thought was lYing. Es-
pecially after I started asking him questions, he kept turning to 
counsel to see whether he srould ~ and Bittrran \-BS a very sharp 
guy. Dean, I didn't _ think told tie truth al::out that item that he 
forgot .that he had destroyed. · · 
Henry Peterson, what do you feel his :rosition was? 
I guess I really. • • • he didn't '5a..Y all th3.t ~ I didn't agree 
·with some of his conclusions, rut I guess.uany' of the wirnesSes -
I really wasn't too satisfied with~- I\ "~· 
SL - Butterfield? 
\,-SC - Butterfield ·was a believable witness. Although I th:mght he ji..m-tped 
too quickly at the notion, that "I'm not Deep Throat". He called 
Haldemann the Vice President or sare thing of that nature, seoond in 
corrmand, and said that I'm n:>t Deep Throat, he obviously had read -~ 
All the President's Hen very closely. But Butterfield was credible. 














Cohen - 17 
TM - Kalmback? 
WSC - Kalmback - he was critical, but I guess I was just dis-
appointed in him. This man looked to me like (when I used 
to go to the movies as a kid) the man who had the white 
house, a two car garage, a nice man really, and an in-
surance job or something. And yet he was going Lround 
with a black bag and passing out the ambassadorships, sim-
ply on good faith. I didn't really sympathize with him 
much, I guess. But I thought he was really truthful. 
Who else? La Rue - I didn't think was telling the truth. 
DFS - Well, passing on to your own relationships to other mem-
bers of the Committee. For example, say on the 10th of 
July and the 18th of July, _there were two Republican Cau-
cuses, I believe. On both occasions, I think, Hutchinson, 
for all practical purposes, said he just was unable to 
understand the Rebuplican who could vote for impeachment. 
Was that pretty much directed - the first time-:-. at you? 
WSC - I felt so. 
DFS - What was your reaction? 
WSC - I was about to respond and Railsback said something. We 
were then again defending Jenner, or I was defending Jenner 
based upon something that he had done. He seemed to have 
a capacity to get himself into more trouble - almost · 
deliberately at times - I was in the process of defending 
him. That was not the original understanding under which 
he was hired, we were looking for someone with academic 
credentials, and trial experience, we didn't look for some-
one who was simply going to be a partisan advocate. I 
think . that was the point of the conversation on one of those 
occasions, ~d then it came back to what Hutchinson said, · 
"I can't believe that a Republican would vote for impeach-
ment. We'd better find out who they are." I know that was 
directed toward me. And Railsback stepped in and said, "Ed, 
I'm not sure how I'm going to vote. I might be one of those 
who votes for impeachment." It got even more heated. I 
think Chuck Wiggins br.oke it off at that point. · We then 
had lunch, as I recall, at the Capitol Hill Club that day. 
Railsback, myself, Ham, and Caldwell had lunch at the Capi-
tol Hill Club that day to talk about the implications of 
what Hutchinson had said. I think -they were concerned 
about what he was saying at that point. Caldwell was not 
at the caucus that morning. 
DFS - Would you comment on Jenner? So many people had taken 
obviously different views •· on him, do you think he did the job 
for which he was hired? 
WSC - Yes, I do. As I understood it when he first came on, ~here · 
was no talk of simply being a partisan advocate, as I recall. 
They had some apprehensions about Doar - that he would sim-
ply be what they called a "Kennedy-Republican.• That was 
the phrase they used to describe him. And that he would 
not really be objective and would be a partisan and 
., 
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WSC - they were looking for some one to balance him. There was 
discussion about his qualifications, academic credentials, 
or trial experience, and that he be very well known, re-
puted and so forth, so that it would enhance our own position. 
Railsback was responsible for getting Jenner. I think Jen-
ner made some mistakes initially. He never should have 
made the mistake of giving his view on what was Bil impeach-
able offense. He at least should have met with us, and at 
- 1east reviewed the material. But I thought Jenner made a 
bad error in expressing himself publicly and I think he 
damaged himself with the other Members of the Committee 
who wanted to get rid of him immediately from that point 
on, but felt that they could not. I think that he made a 
mistake when on one of the crucial nights he took off and 
went to Texas on a long standing commitment. That was the 
night that Doar got torn apart when Wiggins destroyed him 
and rightfully -so. And Jenner wasn't there at the time. 
He was down 1n Texas making a speech, e.nd making public 
statements, I think that he did enough things that could 
have warranted his dismissal 1n terms of public statements 
on behalf of his client which put him in a very difficult 
position in -terms or - representing us, serving as counsel -
yet going his own independent way. But I think as far as 
what he tried to do -in the investigation, I think was the -
right thing. 
DFS - Did the White House ever have any contacts with you during 
the spring or last summer? 
WSC - There was one occasion in which they invited me to go on 
the Sequoia to which Railsback made his famous statement. 
Two occasions, one I turned down, the other time they invited 
me. There was one call I received, from the White House, 
about an appointment or some position in New England - as 
to .who I would recommend for the position. I believe the 
call came from V.P. Ford's office. 
DFS - Weren't you kind of disinvited to the Sequoia the second time? 
WSC - Something happened, ~ have to go back and review that, some-
thing happened where I was called and they called back and 
said that no there isn't any room or something to that ef-
fect. And I had no intention of going anyway and then Rails-
back picked it up and said "That if you did go, it would be 
the first time the Sequoia ever travelled into shark infested 
waters." But I ,had tried to -stay away from any connection 
because it might be misconstrued. 
SL - Just how did you view Mr. St. Clair's performance? 
WSC - I think that he did an excellent job up until the final 
day. · And then I think that he made one of the worst mistakes 
of his career. _And that was when, after making a beautiful 
summation, I thought 1t was one of .the most effective I 
had s~en, he offered a partial transcript of the tape that 
we were after and it just provoked outrage and I thought 
just wiped out the effectiveness of the presentation that 
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do it. As a trial attorney, I th:)Ught, he was su,r::erior to I:bar 
or Jenner in tenns of his examination on;Jl cross~tion in 
the manner he v,'ent al::out it, looking at it from a technician'~ -. _. .- /4.., 
r:oint of view. Jenner I tlought,,lal:orious as he -.....-as, was· an old -- -~ , 
trial attorney who had teen through a lot of cases arrl,y;~J"got to · J\ j 
dot every i and cross every t. Ard it -was P3-inful at tli:-es. CXlr ! 
side was sh:mtin; at him alsrrost to stop rut he kept goin:J arrl go~ _· I 
ing. So, it's a lot easier in terms of cross-examining e5?0==ially __ - . 
scmeone like St. Clair WIX) is very gcxxl at it. He is a very skilled :- _ . f -
cross-examiner. But there were sar.e thiJBs that I just o:mldn't :--~ -~-. · 
relieve, like at one fX)int he's ask:µlg O'Brien did anyo~e ever men-. ~ : 
tion the ~rds to you "'quid pro quo,''did anyone ever call ·this·· ·. · - . I 
"rush noney" ruid ~e said_~ "no sir, no sir." Then you had peo__pl~ , · I .,...... I 
like ¥.cClory behlrrl us who was sa~-ti-'-.a~ affirr.t1vkt St. Clair ~ 
just said that o~ one rrentioned quid pro quo arrl m ~e mentioned 
hush rroney. ~~Hls" a CX)py of the transcript in front of him which 
clearly shJws that they had been ta1ki.nJ al:out this for a gocd 
rrany rronths. - And then 1-k:Clory asking questions knowing tr..at we had 
been through the testinony. I just kirrl of haq. to look over my - _ 
_ slnulder and say, -"My God the t?="anscripts are sittin3- in front of : 
him!" That is why I asked O'Brien the question, "I've assumed that -
you have read tlnse transcripts?" "Yes, I have." And I said based 
ufX)n your reading of the transcripts do you still rraintain that .. __ . 
Ehrlichran didn't Jmow anything- alxmt it? And he said, whlch sec- ·, 
tion are you referrin:J to? · I just l~t it 1:€cause ·I didn ~~_;Na11t j 





SL - In view of your, what alrrost happened early on when you lost sane of _ 
the papers, what was your reaction to the cx:mstant leaks? 
WSC - I thought they w:ntld destroy the cre:libility of the Couraittee. _I ,;.;as 
ro:ocerne:1 a.rout it. '- I made public sta;=:anents al:out it~ to 
several reporters~"they l'Jere a~ aro.it it, arrl I said that tie 
Corrmittee deserves to l:e criticize:1, it is an unfair thi..--ig that is 
takinJ place, arrl I always had the suspicion frankly, tr..at the news 
media had access to the rer:crts or t.'-E infornation before we ever 
did. There ·was time after time, after I ~d cane out _of that rcx:rn 
arrl a re_FOrter -....ould ask me a question al:out which he r..ad to have ·_ --
prior knJwle:lge. He wa.ild tben recite a line - it was directly _. 
out of the transcript that \',,e had just been reviewing. He had to .have 
sane prior knowledge.- I just felt that because -of the leaks arrl what -
happening that the credihili ty of tlE Carrnittee ~s. l;e~ seriously 
ercx:l.e:1. I might say that my staff took quite a.'
4
'l±utt i:oo:- Prople 
from the National Canmittee used to say to Betty that your l::oss is 
the only one; everyrxrly else is t:D:3'ether but your toss arrl this cre-
ate:1 quite a bit of pressure on her, rut she is a very strong Repub-
lican arrl had to take a lot of aggravation. 
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'IM - How the mechanics of the coalition? It was difficult to try to put 
this together, I didn't really take notes as to v.oo was preSent 
arrl wm was staying away at any one time. But going back a little 
l:efore tie acb.lal first meeting on Tuesday r.orning, to the best 
of your recollection what was the earliest fOSSibly info.:rrral con-
versation that you rray have had with any menJ:ers of the so-called col 
coalition al:out that type of activity? 
v-lSC - The first contact that I had was with Railstack. We had a ·little bit 
of a confrontation one evening when I got an:JIY wi'b.'i. him arrl walked 
away. 
TM - At wrat time was this? In relation to !•bnday or Tuesday?_ • _ _ · _ 
- ··.-..;". ·· .· .:,·_' . . • .. ·: · · - . -· .. _,-_-. ,f-1'.rf:~ '-
WSC - It was a little earlier than that. This was dur~~wse of the 
witnesses. We w-ere actually having dinner with S~(1j arrl Rails. 
We rad kirrl of a cxmversation arrl Tan at that p:>int rrade sare refer-
ence, ''Wro knows, I might be with you." And I viOn 't repeat what I 
said to him at that time. But I said that I rs:riernl::er row you ~e 
·with me l:ack on the letter to the President. I don't put tcXJ rrruch 
stock in where you are and ~J-a..._more, I don't care, it was that 
kind of a conversation. But .that -was prol:ably the first meeting that 
I had any contact • . We had never really discussed any of this arrong 
ourselves. Tam got concerned with an article by Pinclms. In fact while 
I was interrogating O'Brien, he leaned over to me after the testinony 
arrl said, "Gee, that's a great job, cane on outside, I want to talk 
to you." · After L,had f;i.nished examining O'Brien, we went out into the 
side rcan, into }t>~~rfice, and he s.h:Jwed me a copy ofainckus' 
article pertaining to the b.rrning over of infornation ~ the gram 
jury. Pinckus had written an article that rad appeared 1n. the Post 
of the propriety of b.rrning over grand jury info:mation ~ Peter-
son to the President. · Tha.t was the first ti.Ire Tan said, "this really 
troubles me. " - I don't recall talking atout it, this -was tlE first . 
tirne that we had discussed any evidence. We didn't talk again until -
one time I was on the floor with Flowers arrl I said, "Sans-mere along 
the way we ought to sit down arrl :perhaps talk al:out it."' 4i'you know 
Flowers is the Derrocratic Pailsb3.ck; they are very nruch alike in 
personality and life style. "Wny don't we get together sorretirr.e arrl 
just talk al:out this tiring." I haven't got the date, I' 11 have to go 
back arrl lCX)k for it, but that ,-,..ias a week or ten days prior to our 
meeting. -
™ - was to you the coalition a natural event? An inevitable occurance? 
vlSC -
Trat these seven \-..ould cane together? ' 
I never gave it a tlnught. I did not really think arout a Coalition 
I didn't thing al:out being with anyl::ody else or how anyone else ,-,..ias 
going to vote. I think tlat I had so steeled myself to say that wha.t 
ever I do, I' 11 probably be lE'fJ; alone Gr-4:.~--e-..mldn: • t li:! any _ 
b0dy--else--t:here-who-€ared-a~t..-p)in11. I had recon:::ilerl myself to . 

































.. - ----- __ I 
wsc -
Cohen - 21 
back in my district, difficult to explain to my constitu-
ents, and as I said, I truly felt I would not be back. But 
what I was more concerned with was that I did what I felt 
was right. I didn't really care what others did. 
I really didn't think about a Coalition. Two nights after 
we sent a letter to President Nixon we were on television -
ABC network - McClory, Kastenmeier and myself and McClory 
was kind of backing away from his vote and saying "Well, I 
didn't think it was compliance, but I don't think this is 
the route to go." The whole thing sort of shifted at 
that point. I just felt that I didn't know how they were 
going to vote and I felt Rails was going to have a tough 
decision because of his districts Fish had problems with 
his fathers didn't know what Caldwell was going to do, 
didn't even inquire. I knew that most of the other ones 
were going to vote "no.• 
TM - I think it was a Friday before the Tuesday when John Doar 
circulated the so-called -drafts of different articles in a 
black notebook and I bell.eve that was the first time we ac-
tually -were -able -to see in-written-language- the potential 
articles of impeachment. Do you ·recall your reactions to 
reading those articles? 
WSC - Well, the first articles that I think I saw were Jack Brooke's. 
TM-
Which I thought were horrendous. As I recall I made a state-
ment to Doar and Jenner one evening, a few days prior to the 
presentation that I felt that if there were going to be im-
peachable offenses they could only come under two headings, 
abuse and the other was · the cover-up. Those were the two 
general categories, you must set these forth in the way of 
an indictment. In my own mind I had to separate the alle-
gations into abuse, and the cover-up. 
Had you put anything 
have any tho~ghts of 
potential articles. 
following Wednesday. 
1n writing up to that point? Did you 
about that time, "Here are drafts of 
It's Friday, we're going on TV the 
Any of' these or some of these?• -
WSC - I had -assumed that was already done. When we got together 
we just talked in terms of which one we thought we could 
accept and which one we could not. But in view of the pre-
sentations by Doar f'rom day one up until his final summation, 
it just did not occur to me that they didn't have something 
spelled out. 
TM - Do you recall how you got to Railsback's office? How did 
you learn of the meeting in Railsback's office. 
WSC - I think that you -probably told me, saying that there was going 
to be ·a meeting over there between some of the people and I 
was surprised at who it was going to be, 
Cohen 22 
DFS - You ,·.>2re surpri sed? 
~]SC - I didn't know win was going to :t.e over there. I tiought rr:ay be 
Flov,ers, ItE.Y be Pay Th:>rnton. I had tremendous a-rrount of respect 
for Thornton - a kind of a Im.1tual admiration scciety, I guess. He 
had agreed during the rourse of the hearings that if I ever wanted 
any time, he \-.ould yield his time to me. So I tlot."ght that Flowers, 
and ThJrnton wJUld l:e there and I th:mght Rails, of co~se, "'-.:...utl.d be 
there and myself and p:::)Ssibly Fish. 
™ - N"nat arout Henry Smith? 
w"'SC - '.No, I hever .thought Henry ,;..ould be there. 
DFS. - Or M:Clo:ry? 
wsc - No. 
• I ,,.
I 
-- ---- -- - - - · • . l 
., , 
~ 
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. 'IM - This is the second interview ·with Congressr.Bn Cohen - present 
are Congressnan Cohen, Steve Lynch, Tom 11::x)ney, Jrme 20, 1975-; -----
app:roxirrate tirne 1:45 p.m. 
W,~~ 
W"'SC - The special prosecutor last time, that's the copy of the article 
I\ that I was referring to. The other thing, is I 1::elieve the I..os 
Angeles Times. I '11 make a copy of this - this is t."lie article 
to the Glol::e, it will l:e coming out on the FourBi of July or on 
Nb(t:mc:L-s the anniversary of~ resignation. But I t..'cx)ught it might . ' . be of interest to :yuu. ,./, y ,._ .s 
'1!-1 - It will, irrleed. 
- .-·-.· . ... :,:::_. · ....:. ~,;.- ~. - ~~--- ~-~~;.: .· ,·: . . -:-_ ";";: .. ~~- _, . - . -:·. 
¼1SC ::... !"don't know if you need that ir.aterial on the Ford conformation or 
not - the whole tlring al:XJut Judge Byrne? 
'IM - · I think that is - I think that lays a foundation for sare of your 
thinking in that area. It started considerably earlier. 
WSC - Let's see, pages 44, 45, 81 and _ 82 -and 83 - that's s:::me of the 
stuff on Ford. 
'IM - I' 11 get that out of my l:x:xJk, very gcx:x1. 
WSC - I think that co-vers the tone, the type of examination I would conduct. 
'IM - Yes, indeed. 
,,,. 
SL - I think I recall running around trying to firrl that 1:ook for yc:u 
during the Ford proceeding. -
'IM - ·we left _off last time with the mechanics of the coalition. · Coing ba.ck 
wsc -
to when you first recall l:eing approached and by wh:m arrl row you -
ended up in Pailsl:ack 's office and I w::,uld like to direct your atten-
tion, if I may to, section "Chronology" in your 1:ook. It was diffi-
cult to try to :put this all toget.l"Er, as far as the diff ea:nt :rreetings, 
whether or not they occurred in sor.ie insta.11ces an::1 t.~11 WIX> ·was present. 
I didn't write down the notes that I ,..ould have oorarnlly taken as a coun-
sel to a su1:xx:mnittee. Things l:eing as chaotic as they were, I tried 
to prirrarily get the substance as far as what people , ... -ere saying. 
Looking at Tuesday morning July 23, my recollection is that you were 
very definitely there and v.0uld you want to· comnent on your impres-
sions of that first meeting m Railsl:ack's office. 
~c:::&,..,~ 
I gue~, I was surprised at h::>w many were there and whJ \Ere there. 
Obviously~ Railsl:ack ,-a.ild l:e there, I trought, Flrn~s were and pos-
sibly Thornton. I don it recall if I know whetr.er Hann \..ould be 
there, I didn't expect to see Butler there. Mr. Froehlich wasn't 
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WSC - the casualness of it, I guess. I v:alked through the door ar.d I 
'l,,;er1t and sat d rn..rn teh.j_rid. TCT:! ' s c '!-i.2. ; ,... _ So!"'ec:ce =~:._;;~~ ::::2 , :::: ;-..:e 3:; i t 
was you, flipped me a coffee roll. 
'IM - I did, it was a D:t.'1.i.sh or sc:methlng. 
WSC - A Danish, and I was sitting behind there. Tom had that lo~ table 
m front of his desk where everyb::x:l.y was sitting down and I was sit-
tmg reek 
TI1 - lmd everylxxiy ga~ed around you. 
i,JSC - I just kind of v.1as impressed with the spirit of the place, it v.1as : 
· very casual, · .;well; · let's just sit down arrl see M12re we are,.. · 
it was very informal. If you shake it ~ dO¥,i, I think tr.at was 
Flov.er 's expression, if you take a reg,!uprr~ OO,o;n and dunp it all out 
what have :you got? Is there anything that we can agree on tli..at consti-,-
tutes an impeachable offense. I think that we discussed Jack BrcX>k's 
impeach:nent articles tra.t v}e th:J'=19'ht were prer:osterous as drafted . 
and could not be supp:)rted by any of us there. We just started a very 
info:mal way of saying what our ·arguments are and what is troubling to 
all of us and I think that is ab:Jut all that I can recall of that meet-
ing. 
'lM - Did you expect to see sanel:ody tr.ere woo wasn't there? Otr.er rranbers 
of the Ccmnittee may}:e? 
va=: - Was Ham Fish there, was he at the first rr.eeting? 
TM - Yes, he was. 
·,_ , . 
W3C - I know that we-wer-er- There was sane concern on whether~ slnuld in- · 
vi te M:Clory. He-vias-pretty-:i:nht::maf-us-te-sa~ Tan felt 
under sane obligation to infonn him of what we were doing. 
'IM - On Wednesday, I think I made a mistake here. I definitely recall you __ 
being there i-,ednesday rrorning when the Sulx:cnrnittee met ar.d they star-
ted to hash out the differe."lt drafts, Wednesday afternoon it was very 
chaotic as you recall. 7 :30 p.m. on Wednesday the del:ate vas 
supr:osed to start. And they gat.liered in Failsback's office at approxi-
mately 2:30 p.rn. The meetmg started arrl in my initial reaction I did 
not include you in taht meeting . but on second th:mght, this canes reek 
and I \-.ould like to search your recollection on tra.t. It was at this 
meeting that we received a ph:me call fran Frank Polk, wherein Frank 
said that re urrlerstcxxl there · ·are a m:mi.l:er of It1e'i1rers gathering and 
and actually drafting articles and that he \&.ould like to advise us that 
he was draf-µng an article for Mr. Clary and wanted to know whether or 
not !•~ory could come over something and i went back to that group 
with t.hat message ar.d my recollection is. that you weren't b.'iere at that 
time. 
WSC - I think that I missed one of the aftenx>on meetings. 
I 
I 
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- I came back and I gave them the message, that Mr. Mcclory 
was working on an article too and whether or not he could 
join or what not and there was considerable discussion at 
that point but it was decided by the group that they would 
sena over their work file at the · date to Mcclory to loo~ at, 
here it gets fuzz~. 




I did col!le in ~a use we were discussing how we were · going to : 
carry it out that night~a-n<t-still working on the ~m~f4-on·. 
that all this backup _data would be available.~~ ~~t:1irough 
artic-le'- on-e- an-d --then- w~ -f igured- -t:bat we wou~ still have - ·_ 
enough time the next- diy to get through article two. W~ _'. 










we thought ·we would have · some time as, ·,: L·rec~ll, not · ~i~ein7: ::·-: ·.-. :..c any thought to the strat;egy of Sandman. · · -· -
TM - Do you recall when you learned ·that the Coalition had - sent 
over to McClory a draft of its. work? Did you learn _that as 
you came in late? 
WSC - I wasn't too conc~i'4!td• Mcclory didn't matter to m~wh-e-t-h-e-t: 
h~~~te-d--o-!:' what~he did. I just figured that there 
was a wasted effort to begin with. It was a case of --
well, I don't want you to record . this so I won't say it I 
guess. 
TM - I think that it's already been recorded,' by other _members, · 
your reaction is what i'm after, your reiction to th~:~ews 
the draft of an article had been delivered to McClory? Do 
you recall any statement that you might have made? 
WSC - Does someone else recall a statement that I made? 
TM - Several sources. (very much jumbled talk_ and laughter) 
In particular you were very vocally concerned that it was~ 
let out to Mr. Mcclory who you thought at some point might 
have a tendency to disclose it to people that might not 
beas interested in what we were doing as you would hope. 
WSC - I'm sure that I said something, but I can't remember 
what I said though -- what did others say that I said? 
TM · .... Well they say that you actually said that you were very 
alarmed that when it was sent to McClory it's as good as 
printed in the Washington Post the riext morning, you said 
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WSC - Why, when McClory d1d.n •·t want any part of that particular 
group. Should we communicate it to him. That just troubled 
me. I guess. 
TM - Do you recall being at that afternoon meeting? 
WSC - Only briefly. I know that I d1d.n't go on time. 
TM - I know from my recollection you came 1n late. You came in 
late and you nodded and you were there working for awhile 
and then you had somehow learned, discovered that the McClory 
·had received the draft. And my recollection that at that 
point you expressed some discomfort at letting that out • 
WSC - I'm sure- that's true. As to what they say I said, I have 
to reserve the right to disagree. Tone 1t down, I don't 
know how we are going to write th1s thing up but he was 
not one or my favorite people on the Committee. I was 
upset with his attitude during the course of the examination 
that we talked about last time where O'Brien would make 
a statement that he- thought 1 t · ·was the- first - time -that --
Ehrlichman had learned any of this and the transcript is 
,sitting there and McClory is asking him a question, con-
firming his impression that Ehrlichman was just getting 
into it. That sort of question offended_ me, I guess~ · 
- , 
TM - Going down through these ·meetings, do you ah,' there were 
two evening ·meetings, dinners, that you had at the - Capi-
tol a111 Club, The first I do not have you 11sted as being 
present, Thursday, July 25th, this was after almost at · the 
completion of- ~ebate, but I think that debate was still 
going on and ·prior to the Friday dinner that was so chaotic. 
. What we-.::.were doing at this dinner was putting the final 
_touched on article one1 Hogan was there for the first time, 
· -Frank Polk was there for the first time. 
WSC - This isn't the night that .Diane anct the boys were with me, 
was it? 
TM - No, I think that was the chaotic night. 
WSC - That's right. I don't think I was at the meeting before then. 
TM - Then the third one, Friday morning you recall, the Sarbanes 
Substitute was introduced and all afternoon on national TV, 
Mr. Wiggins and Sand.man were attacking the substitute. At 
~ o'clock the :full committee recessed for dinner and we 
moved over to the Capitol Hill Club. Would you just give 
us your personal recollections of that meeting? 
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WSC - As you say, it was fairly chaotic and the group was in 
disaray. It had been routed by Sandman and Wiggins and I 
thought justifiably so; I a g ree with what S a nd man was s ay ing. 
I was pretty disgusted with our staff that to think we had 
gone through this process of drafting these articles and had 
nothing to substantiate the points. There seemed to be no 
response that anyone warited to dev~lop at that meeting, and 
I think that finally I said w'ell "Damn it I'll draft article 
one myself if I have to stay up all n:i,fl;t to d·o it or what 
ever it was going to take, but it h:.e'1t-t~ be ready by to morrow." 
I did say someth~ng to that eftect. 
TM - Oh, you did indeed. You looked over at me and you rattled off 
to wit and etcetera. 
·:·•:•:;-:: 
WSC - I just could~'t understand why they had not done this 
why we had been laboring under the misaprehension it was 
going to be done and we basically were looking quite foolish. 
Some members wanted to say they are taking the wrong position 
but I felt that Sandman and Wiggins were right. 
TM - Did you fe~l t tbat the Coalition or its work product was in ' 
danger at that point? 
WSC - I thought the whole thing was in danger at that point. ·And 
it was a ~uestion of being publicly and nationally embarassed. 
Thatyou go through ·a nine-month investigation and then have 
Sandman who hadn't said a word during the entire nine months 
suddenly say1/ell✓ where's the evidence, will. you . give us an , 
example. If you had to indict a man you would set forth a 
b c, give such and such, w!27. do you say that he's abused his 
powers? For example? ~ju-;-f~undamental law, I thi;k, that 
they were raising and we weren't there. · one of the things 
that I had always prided myself on as a pra~ticing attorney, 
I was always prepared. Always did the work myself, here I got 
in the situation that somebody else was doing the work and it 
wasn't there. And we were at bay. I wasn't too happy about it. 
SL - You talk about the staff, it is really amazing but I think 
that they got to that point and didn't provide anybody with 
any information. When you wanted to go to somebody, who did 
you have to go to, just Doar and that was it, could you have 
called someone right away and say listen we need this or who 
are the experts in the area? . 
wsc I never really had much access to the staff at all. I went 
over I remember, a number of occasions to the headquarters 
and they would provide me with variRus books that were 
there but I never really felt muchqliberty to call on the 
individual members for research at~a given point or whatever. 
I pretty much relied on Doar's presentation, what he had there. 
The interviews I went over and read myself ·and also relying on 
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SL - Some critics have said one of the problems of the inquiry · 
staff, is that Doar was so much in command, that really every-
thing had to go through him, every decision that was made, do 
you think that was one of the problems then? 
\.~ 
WSC - I think the decisions shouldAbe:made by him. I don't disagree 
with that, · I question some of his judgmen~ from time to time 
and I had doubts about what he was doing but I really didn't 
question his organization methods. I thought he was pretty 
stubborn; once he got on a point you couldn't really s~ake 
him. As you noticed throughout the hearings I tried to get _ 
him to attach something to a subpeona and he refused to do it. 
Ans then he forgot, he said he would do it one time and forgot 
to send them in another envelope and I said would you please 
send in another envelope _ a copy of the items for the justifi-
cation, and he forgo~ to d~ it. He was stubborn in that regard. 
TM - Before we move on any further, just one more point about th~t 
Friday dinner, do you recall for the record first of all, your 
wife and children were present. Do you want to identify them? 
WSC - Kevin and Christopher .- and Dia~e. 
TM - Do you recall the resolution of that meeting? It was, you 
indicated chaotic--
wsc - ~""-It was angry and frustrated. The members had go~stung and they 
didn't really know what to do. Who was going to take what, how 
do we respond to it, we got to go back an television that night, 
how to cope with the assault being waged. 
TM - Do you recall ;he alternatives devel~ped, the plan if .any? 
WSC - The plan was tha~ the Doar staff wnuld come back in the morn-
ing with justifications for the bases for the article and in 
the meantime we were to fend as best we could for the rest of 
the evening on nationa;a--:Iwide television. Yeah, that was the 
only plan. I had gotten to the point wher I said, "Look I will 
do it ·myself, I intend to stay up all night, I can draft article 
one to substantiate every portion." I was prepared to do that. 
I was so mad. I just felt that i tJas a real snafu and tha·t 
w-,a-s- I ~was number one, embarassed, ~ I was one of those who was 
working on it, was seen and had been perceived as supporting 
the ~rticles and yet there w~s nothing there to support it and 
had . I known that they were not prepared, I would have done all 
the work myself. 
TM - Do you recall the tactics that were _developed lat~r? 
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TM - The motion to strike by Flowers. 
meeting do you recall? 
Did that come out of the 
WSC - We had agreed that night that I would be given article one, I 
guess one facet of it. 
TM - Yeah, it was about nine sub parts, I believe. 
WSC - We just agreed generally that we were going to divide it up. 
We didn't see what the justifications were, we got them first 
thing the following morning, but nothing · that night. Saturday, 
I have to go back to my notes to find out what ti ra e in the 
morning_ that I c am e in • But I got~~ e in the morning and 
· then I went over them and changed ~~~~mewhat. Then we agreed 
that morning upon the strategy. ~e ~ssumed that Sandman was 
8_,2)-ng to insist on his motion, then they would yield to me. 
"7hen when he backed off, Flowers picked it up. And they just 
yielded to me, 
TM - Do you recall a meeting in Railsback's office, Saturday, · 
July 27th between 10 and 11:307 I believe Hogan was present 
and Polk. 
WSC - Hogan was at the first meeting, wasn't he? 1k wasn't there. 
TM - My notes indicate that Hogan never joined the group but he made 
bis press conference. 
WSC - One day earlier, Tuesday. 
TM - On Tuesday, the first day we met, and he never j:oined _ _ the group. 
until Thursday evening for dinner, at the Capitol Hill Club, the 
first dinner. 
WSC - I didn't go t to that dinner. 
TM 
·,· .. ..• 
You missed that dinner, to my recollection. Do you know why 
you missed that dinner, do you recall? 
WSC - No, I don't recall. 
TM - Let's go to that Saturday, I believe that/ was a meeting on 
Saturday following the Friday which we had taken the beating on 
national TV, Railsback's office, I believe, to work and discuss 
· the actual drafting of article two. 
WSC - · I don't think that I was at that -- I didn't really have that 
much time. Once they had divided up the work on the part of 
the Coalition be tween Ham Fish and J.~~a¥Y,pd me and Ray 
Thornton, I don't recall my working~' I ieally don't work a 
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TM - I've noticed that over the years. 
WSC - Over the years, I guess I ~croonally out of habit I tend to be 
a loner most o f the ti me and I j us t do n o t ge t inv o lv ed i n 
work groups, work group activity. So maybe that was it. once 
I knew what~ had to do then I just assumed that everybody 
would do what they had to do on their own and I didn't need to 
be there, unless it was absolutely necessary for me to go, I 
don't think I did and that's probably been true with everything 
I've done here. Unless I re~aave to do it, I _aoc?.,:,i .. ~1J<5a 
to sit around and engage in philosophicaY~iscussions';"' 
I · knew what I had to s a y and i f t e y needed it f1-n e , but o the r 
than that I've got other things to do. 
TM - Before we move off of this issue, just the adjective has 
b~en used to -describe the coalition a~ "fragile.~ 
WSC - That's Railsback's. You recall he used that the first time 
during the discussion on Article III and on Cambodia. He a -f..JC4..S 
a member of that "fragile Coalition" and had some second 
thoughts, something to that effect. And I recall I spoke 
shortly thereafter that as far ·as this member was concerned 
that coalition wasn't very fragile and that µo . matter what 
happens with the article I intended to remain. 
TM - You know I don't recall that, really. 
WSC - Oh, yes, that's from the debates, I didn't agree with that notion 
that it was fragile and futhermore it didn't really matter to 
me whatever it was. When ·I walked into the room I was full of 
surprise and a little pit of relief saying that at least you're 
not alone and there are some other people who share ypur views 
as well. That is always comforting. But by that point it 
really didn't matter to me whether Railsback stayed in or 
stayed out or what anyone else was going to do, I had already 
resolved myself as to what I was going to do. And I -just didn't 
want Tom to~ the characterization of },g :f::: "fragile." 
v-Y- . 
TM . - Number 11 deals with involving _drafts of artilces one and two 
the last week, and we've got primarily the project down at 
Hilton Head, when the group gets together and try to discuss 
the drafts, some of the thinking of what was going on --,, 
WSC - Well, doesn't Jim Mann have copies, we each have copies and 
_ they were all initialed and we turned them in•~ause I wanted 
mine back. ~ · 
TM - I've got a couple of yours, with your name on them. 
wsc - Now that you remind me of it, this was p~obably my. reaction 
to sending over to McClory that here we went through th~s · 
whole ~rocess of turning the drafts back in, initialed ~hem 
and make sure that we keep them in one spot, so i~'s not 
.~~ ,-"':i disclosed an~ then they turn around, after we go through all 
A ~ 
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WSC - this work and send a copy over to McClory who wasn't a part 
of the group and I thought that was kind of i n consista--nt to 
say the least· • . 
TM - Maybe just one other point in recalling the final week, the 
intensity of the work, the pressures, the press, the phone 
calls, we may have covered this a little bit earlier but just 
a com~ent on the pressures, time wise and otherwises that you 
may have been under that week? 
WSC - I would have to go back and look through my notes and my day-
books in terms of what I was doing during the course of that 
ti m·e ~ The p res sure was b u i 1 ding up f o 11 owing Jenner 1 s . s tat e -
ment on the p~eceeding Thursday or Friday? 
TM - Whe.n was that Steve-?· - .. -:· ·:·· < •--~·.: . ·- ·· 
/ 
SL - Th~ Saturday ·, the 20th, after Garrison ~as through with his 
presentation. 
TM - The 20th of July. 
. 
WSC - I guess my own position at the . time was one, I was disappointed, 
I was angry, at what happene~ -those final days, Railsback and 
I came late to a Republican Caucus, we walked in and ~ere ~· 
advised that they had just taken a vote to replace Jenner with 
Garrison as counsel and each of us said, please record me as 
being . against that~ but we ·.were the ~nly two, Ham Fish may have 
been ' the third, but I think that we were the only two that said · 
no • 
TM - There is no record of that. 
WSC - No record of what? 
TM - This caucus, wasn't it a Republican Caucus? 
WSC - I see what you mean, but that's what happened that morning. 
And when Garrison made his presentation, I can recall making . 
some public statements about it. The press came and{slad what 
do you think about this -- I tried to gloss over it without 
getting into any contest on it. But the whole shift of things 
during the f~nal days in terms of what was taking place, built 
considerable pressure I thought. I've really got to go back 
and look/at my notes on what .I was doing. It would be more 
help~ll I think. As far as the pressure, I wrote my speech 
the night before it was given. I was up until about 2:30 or 
3 o'clock, as I recall with Diane, and just sat up and just 
talked to her on what was going to take place. I think she 
went to bed around thre~ o'clock and then I started writing it 
and then that'~wh~ I started reading, ahll-, I had a copy of 
the Federalist IIT I was reading through t~2~ &R~ wae ~eiRg 
~ck ~tt~owgh i't'. And I started writing about 4:30 or 5 o:clock 
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TM - Where did you pick up th~ idea of the description of circum-
stantial evidence, or tracing footprints through the snow? 
WSC - Oh, I had a long talk with a former employer of mine; Thomas 
Lambert, the American Trial Lawyers Association, he is the 
man t hat I talked t o. He 1s probably my closest friend. I 
had called him in the past about getting advice aiout Ja-
worski, for example. · Tom is one of the top prosecutors in 
the Nuremberg war trials, and he was an outstanding man at 
Nuremberg, he was a Rhodes scholar, he was the president 
of a law school down in Florida when he was 26 years old. 
Just an outstanding man, the most eloquent man that I',_ve 
ever heard speak. The most gifted orator, I think, in . the 
country. Anyway, I spent a year and a half working with Tom 
and from- time to time we call each other. And I called · 
him one night and it was late and just stayed on the phone 
and talked to him and told him what it was like down here 
and we had kept in touch from time to time·. And we started 
talking about circumstantial evidence and going back, I think 
I recalled to Tom that classical example he used to give of 
circumstantial evidence was by Thoreau "when you find a 
trout ·1n the milk." We talked for an hour and a half just 
dealing with -philosophy basically and Tom is really a great 
philosopher. We didn't discuss any facts but only philoso-
phy that night and the whole discussion of circumstantial 
evidence evolved into a long conversation. 
. I . 
. -
TM - After the vote and prior to the release of the last Nixon 
tape, . as a lawyer, anticipating the Senate trial, did you 
feel that the case was defensible? · 
WSC - Yes, I felt comfortable with making that presentation to the 
Ho~se ,without tha~ tape. 
TM - And now what about the Senate? Going to trial in the Senate, 
actually? _ · 
WSC - In the Senate, I would have reviewed the request for the tapes 
and had insisted. upon thema failure particularly in view of 
the Supreme Court's decision, to turn them over, I thought 
would have warranted negat~ve inferences. I did before anyway 
but it was even more clear-cut after the Supreme Court de-
cision. But I felt tpat even without that particular tape 
the cas_e was prov1:1,ble? 
TM - Were you approached during that- --particular time as a poten-
tial manager? - · · 
WSC - Bob Eckhart, as I recall, on the floor one day said he wrote 
an article for some local magazine and they asked him who he 
would recommend as prosecutors, the managers, of the bill 
if it ever went to the Senate and he said, "I hope that you 
don't object but I recommended you. You were one of those 
that had the type of qualities that we were looking for• 
and he went 
-, 
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WSC - into a very complimentary dissertation of what they were 
looking for. Who would make a good manager and what qual-
ities. That's ·the only suggestion that camer most of it 
came from reporters. But no one ever asked me and I didn't 
inquire, I didn't really want to be asked, just avoided the 
whole issue. I said that I would have to give it long 
serious thoughts but I'm not inclined to, and th~~ some peo-
ple picked up that as saying that I would give it serious 
thought, they just misinterpreted it, saying that I was 
looking forward to doing it and I wasn't. I didn't want 
to do it. · 
TM - What was your political situation in Maine at that time? 
WSC - I guess that it was unpredictable at that point, prior to 
his admission. I think I had very _high approval rating the 
first year in Congress and I still had one last year, even 
after the thing was over, so I knew that I had strong ap-
proval with what I was doing and I had very low disapproval, 
v very little negative comment. And I just had another one 
done, confidentially, and_ I have about a one· percent dis-
approval. So that's very low. But within the party, itself, 
it was pretty bitter. 
TM - Did you say bitter? 
WSC - Bitter. The lett'ers were running against impeachment. I 
stopped counting .after awhile, I just reached that point 
where I said that I'm not going to get into a tallying con-
test. If I had to guess at it, I would say that the major-
ity were opposed to impeachment. Of the letters that r 
received, the sentiment expressed to me, I think, that the 
majority favored resignation but they were opposed to im-
peachment. · What ··r had done all through this whole· period 
saying that_ I would make a judgment based upon -the facts 
·'· l · 
and the Constitution and that even if 60% (I remember using 
that figure) were opposed to impeachment· and the facts 
warranted, I'm · going for impeachment. I would vote that way. 
But if the facts didn't measure up, then I wouldn't. I just 
said that I hope I can come back and explain to you what I 
will be doing or what I've done and that I've done the right 
thing and if I don't, then ' don't send me back. I went to 
a Republican Convention and spoke at the Convention. One 
woman was down on the front row and said. :. "'Have you ever 
heard of William Pitt Tesseden" and I said, "'Yes."' (You know 
Tesseden is the one who participated in the Johnson impeach-
ment. He was from Maine. He voted against impeaching Presi-
dent Johnson.) And she said,"'Have you read Hlm?" And she 
was there shouting, and I said, "Yes, I have." And she said, 
-Well, do what he did~• And I said, "Well, but he voted 
against his party." · And she said, "'That's no~ what· I meant. " 
Laughter. 
-, 
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SL - Did you go on TV, statewide, in Maine? 
WSC - Yes, I went on a statewide telecast. It was a very inter-
esting experience. I had been getting increasingly run 
down. I had averaged only about three hours of sleep a 
night for almost two months. In fact, I didn't go home 
for dinner one night for almost eight or nine weeKs. I 
was always at the office going over material or going over 
to the headquarters. I got quite run down during this time, 
then when Saturday finally came, after the vote, I had 
promised the people that I would return to Maine and explain 
to them my vote. And so I went up on Sunday and I met with 
the Bangor Daily News editorial board, I went in and all 
three networks, I guess, were up there and they were crawling 
all over- each other, bumping into each other, fighting. An 
actual fight almost broke out between cameramen, and we went 
into the editorial board of the Bangor Daily News and I ex-
plained to them my vote. Then later- that day Diane and I 
took a plane together to Portland where I was going to go 
on statewide television and I had a very bad headcold at that 
point. We ran into some bad weather and the p1lot came 
down rather quickly and it popped this watch I had on. It 
popped the crystal on my watch and all of a sudden my ears 
just filled up and I couldn't hear anything. It completely 
filled my eustachian tube and my temperature went up ·to 
about 103 and I couldn't hear anything. I lost my balance. 
I had no sense of equilibrium. I was very shaky. Well, 
there is nothing more un-nerving than to be so plugged up 
you can't hear. I couldn't hear my own voic·e s I couldn't 
hear _what I was saying,· I 'couldn't even hear a hum, nothing. 
So they had all the major networks there plus statewide 
television and there .were some people in the audience, and 
I went on that night· to give that speech. I should probably 
give you a copy of that speech I gave in Maine, it is some-
what different than the one I gave the night before or sev-
eral days _before, and there has been an analysis done, by a 
student at the University of Maine, studying English, or 
speech or whatever, picking that speech apart. I guess not 
picking it apart but analysing it, to determine what I tried 
to accomplish. It wasn't too far wrong. But back in Maine, 
r reduced everything down to the level of the Governor of 
Maine, In fact I was going to include that in the first 
draft I had written. I was going to give that one from the 
rostrum over in the Committee, but I decided there wasn't 
enough time to get that all in. I was very conscious of the 
15 minute limitation. So, I deleted it. I think that Hun-
gate used something sJmilar to it. Yeah, I remember grinning 
to myself saying, son~of~a-gun, I was going ~o use it and 
· I'm glad that I didn't~ Because Hungate came a long time 
bef_ore I did, so I was just as happy that I didn't. That was 
J.n _  .JllY first draft, so I when I went back to Maine I put 1t 
· · baek ·in-. ···· What -± ·had before and changed 1-t -somewhat. What 
if the Governor d1d this, this~ ·this, and this - what would 
your reaction be? It was very well received. 
·, 
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WSC - I was nervous because I couldn't hear and I couldn't tell 
1f my vo1ee wa~ loud enough. I was perspiring rather pro-
fusely at the time. It was a very uncom~ortable feeling, 
the knowledge that this was my statement to · the people of 
Maine a.nd I could...."'l't h~a= 1t. It ".l.."'!9ettled me: but it was·•.·-~ 
well received I guess. It switched everything around as 
fa~ as public attitude was concerned. 
SL - Do you remember on the day before, the actual vote, · do you 
remember your immediate reaction? 
WSC - Let me come back, Steve. I remember I felt so bad when I 
got back here, it was on Monday we were bringing up article 
two, and I can recall that there was one point where I 
found myself getting a bit strident, which I rarely do. 
I hadn't done that while I've been down here. - But I recall 
during part of the debate on Monday I got into that bit, 
•Isn't this amazing, isn't that amazing.• I was being overly 
sarcastic and I was getting so fed up some of the arguments 
that were being made. But normally it would not have gotten 
·· to me; Tne -problem was that I could hear just -a -little bit 
that days I had to do some lip reading, I couldn't really · ~ 
hear everything and I was pretty hoarse at the time, bad 
voice, felt lousy and I think that contributed to my stri-
dency. I-=j'elt bad about it, and I said somet_hing about the 
American Gulag Archipelago. · I think that was· · o·n Monday. 
I think there wa~ a little bit of over statement there, but 
I had been reading that book and it had come across. · There · 
was a section in there .where Solzhenitsyn starts talking 
about the fear that was being generated by the police tac-
tics _in coming to the door and dragging the citizens out and 
alter awhile, he said you Just became so apprehensive about 
wpen they were coming, you wait and wa1t,- you finally thank 
·them for coming to e·nd this kind of terror.· There was some-
thing similar to that in All The President's Men when a 
secretary went out to ~hat lunch with Woodwarcr-or Bern~tein 
and the fear she experienced just being seen with one of 
them and when she· returned the word had already gooten back 
to the ·White House that she had been at lunch with one of 
them. It was that kind of thing. I think it struck my 
mind that here are the seeds, where you're being watched 
constantly and that's what prompted that statement about 
the faint spector or ·an American Gulag Archipelago. It 
was a bit overstated, I think that was Just because I was 
irritated, s1c1t. · --
, 
SL - Do you remember your · 1mmediate ' reaction right after the vote, 
that Saturday night? It's int~resting 1n a couple of inter-
views so far of the members of the Coalition, they said one 
or the things that struck them was that some of the members 
of the Committee were acting, in other words they had been . , 
.. 
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SL - preparing for quite a while for the TV cameras for that 
vote, and that sort of upset them at the time -
WSC - I felt that was true. I wasn't one of those who cried. 
I guess I felt like ~he deed is done" type of thing. Mea-
suring up to this, what you had to do, doing it a:d not 
feeling particularly happy about it. Kind of ·asking "why 
did I have to be 1n the middle of all this. But it's over 
and I'm satisfied that I did the right thing." . I had no 
regrets- about the decision itself. I guess it's something 
you come to at the end of a long ordeal and it's finally 
over. And the hardest thing is to get over the first step 
I guess._ I guess we were all struck by the historical im-
pact that it was going to have, the historical and contem-
porary imp~ct. And you ar~ saying okay, the deed is done. 
It is kind of a sense or relief that you made the decision 
and_ it's done. Now 'it's irreversable and it is over. But 
I felt that there was an awful lot of acting in terms of the 
members of, not so much on our side but on the other side, 
there was no acting on Chuck Wiggins part. He really deeply 
felt sorrow, and when his head dropped when he heard the 
vote, that was Chuck Wiggins. But some of the hard par-
tisans on the other side were feigning. I thought that 
their emotions were inappropriate. That may be ungracious 
on my part. You just .know that there wasn't too much room 
for sympathy or empathy or anything else for Richard Nixon 
on their part. 
SL - We were asking about article one and two, now what about 
article three? 
WSC - You mean McClory's article three? · 
SL - Yeah. 
WSC - I had no intention of supporting that because I just felt 
that you can't rar1fy a failure to comply into an article 
or _impeachment. If we had cited him for contempt, which 
we didn't, then I think it could have been an article of 
impeachment. But I had preferred and had announced for some 
time all along that he had failed to . comply with our sub-
peonas and I would simply draw the negative implication 
that the information was damaging and that would be persua-
sive with me. But unless we were willing to bring a cita-
tion for contempt so that the House could pass upon his 
failure to -comply, then I just think we could not raise it 
to ~he~l~vel7o~:an61mpeachable offemse. 
-=-.;_ • ' 
SL - In your assessment of the various bffenses presented, what 
- role did the offenses of past President's play? 
WSC - Well, none. You mean Andrew .Johnson? 
SL - Any of the past Presidents. 
WSC - You mean what action on the part of all past Presidents 1n 
the field of abuse and so forth. It really wasn't a relevant 
fact to me. I had iots of mail on this 1ssue saying, •Look 
_ft~¥~~ 1'fe,g;dlt~~t4.A -t?3~. 9&fhfi-- Johnson had done.• And 
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WSC - I said, "Yes, that's true, bu~ is that the type or conduct 
we want to ratify and say these are 
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WSC - the standards which we would hold up for our children or 
ourselves as the type of conduct that we want to let offi-
cials engage in. What was done in the past really didn't 
have a --·substantial bearing for me on this. 
TM - Do you think it possibly has been say fro~ FDR's time a 
gradual build-up of Executive power, there has bedn some-
what lessened because of this exercise- of impeachment. Do 
you feel that there was a concentration of power? 
WSC - I think that there has been a growing concentration of power 
ever since FDR. That is one of the reasons why I would not 
have voted for impeachment on the impoundment -issue. It 
wasn't so much the President's usurpation of powers, it was 
Congress- yielding it up, turning it over. I just felt that 
there were some abuses in past ad.ministrations and if there 
had been an impeachment article, it might have warranted 
their impeachment as well. But I didn't think that what 
ever they had done in the past was dispositive of what stan-
dard we hold this President to. We are not talking about a 
retroactive application of unfair standards. Because Ke~ 
nedy may have abused his powers that simply didn't decide 
the question of whether or not the President has abused his 
power. We :-have-~ lost -control of our appropriations process 
because we don't have a systems only last year when they 
couldn't overturn the vetoes, they decided to pass the bud-
get reform act. ~ didn't think we could turn around and 
impeach him for what we had some complicity in. So the role 
of Congress in all this was very important to me. They also 
had the 45 day resolution · which allowed him to continue to 
bomb Cambodia, which I voted against. I voted to have an 
immediate cut-off of the bombing and that failed and Congress 
went with the compromise, but I felt that even if there had 
been some secret bombing, if we had knowledge of it afterwards 
and still gave it support, we couldn't very well say that 
the President should be removed. 
SL - Do you think as a result of the inquiry future generations 
will have a clear definition of an impeachable offense? 
WSC - I'm not sure that there will be any clearer definition. I 
don•~ think we came to a clear definition of an impeachable 
offense, other than the general .statement that it is when 
you have abuse of power granted or usurpation of power not 
granted. There are some broad guidelines. I think it will 
serve as a sobering thought to future Presidents. Remind 
them that power is there and that it can be used if they -~enga ge 
in similar type of conduct. 
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SL - Has your opinion about the news media in the country changed 
as a result of your experience? 
' . l ' 
WSC - I don't think it's changed much, I think it's reaffirmed 
my original opinions , I think it's slanted. I think it 
was slanted during this. 
TM - In what way? 
WSC - I think there was a bias toward impeachment • . Or aganist 
Nixon or whatever, it was there. I think that there are more 
liberals thah there are conservatives in the media located 
here 1n Washington. I won't say it reached the point of 
being completely unfair but it was and is somewhat biased. 
I find it in my own State too at times but I think there 
is a definite bias toward the left and not to ·the right. 
TM - Could impeachment have occurred without the press? · 
WSC - No, it could not have occurred without the press. As a 
matter of fact, impeachment would-not have occurred at all 
but for a good many other factors involved, the press being 
one of them. _It would not have occurred without the Senate 
Watergate Committee. · If you stop and think of what we did 
in terms of our investigation, we did ·very little. All 
we had was a compilation of material that had already been 
gathered by the Senate Watergate Committee. If you take 
away the Senate Watergate Committee, if you take away Judge 
Sirica, who I think even went beyond the bounds of propri-
ety in some instances in getting at the truth of Watergate, 
I think if you had any other Judge you probably would have 
had a different result. Not too many would have handed 
out a 35-year provisional sentence to make sure that someone 
talked and told the truth. If you didn't have the Supreme 
Court Ruling on the necessity of turning over the tapea.-
that's another factor I think that lent a lot of weight to 
it. I would say that without all these other factors you 
wouldn't ·have had impeachment on the merits of what the 
Committee did on its uwn. It would not have voted for im-
peachment. The media was necessary I think 1n terms of the 
coverage. It was an educational process to come from the t 
thought of impeachment at one time being the equivalent of 
capital puhishment of a President. The initial reaction of 
people talking about impeachment over that long period, con-
stantly writing about it, hearing about it, built up a certain 
credibility because the more you talk about it the less · 
dangerous it seems in·terms of upsetting the stability of the 
country. The more people heard about it and learned about 
it, and read about it, the more acceptable the discussion 
of it became~ And no longer was Just something for cocktail 
party talk by the elite. It became more familiar to the 
people and less threatening. 
SL - What benefits_doyou think came out of this for our system? 
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WSC - Perhaps it's too early to tell, but I think it has had a 
good effect upon the country as far as what the meaning 
of the Constitution is and redefining our allegences. That's 
what that article I gave you is all about. 
TM - Why did you wait · until May of '75 to make a decision to 
tape your recollections and your role in the Coalition? 
WSC - Well, I think it's going to be important looking back, 50 
or 100 years from now. As we look back over the Johnson 
impeachment for some illumination and help and guidelines, 
and so forth. I think that's important - an important 
part of our history that the public understand how this 
all came about. · I told you I'm writing something of my 
own because I want one day to disclose how in my mind it all 
really happened, into what everyone else saw and all the 
public posturing, but how I think it all came together. So 
I think it's important, it's important that someday someone 
have this. I'm not sure that now is the time as far as I'm 
concerned. Because I think it would be lost in much of the 
junk thatl-:has been written about Watergate and about Im.~ 
peachment and that is not what I want. I would like to see 
someday that each of us write our own stories as how we came 
to our separate versions of the Truth. 
TM - Very good, thank you. 
I 
WSC - Okay. 
END OF TAPE THREE 
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TM - Also you will have close by a chronology of' the erucial days, the meeting 
days, which might be halpful to look at, as we move thru this. 
00 - There are also copies of the Doar drafts here. 
CB - Yes, that is one o! the things that has been missing. Did we get the 
Dear drafts on a Saturday or a Friday? 
JM - In the old black notebook, and there were five set~ •••• 
00 - And they are all here. You received them on Friday, July 19th. 
JM - And I think we all fairly well ignored them. 
CB - Well, we ~ead thea and saw nothing to justify retaining them. 
TR - Nothing to commend them. 
WF - I don't think I even read them. 
JM - I guess we need a little more information about the actual sources of 
these drafts because one was by the impeachment staff', one or more, one 
was by Brooks, and I don't know really the source or the others. But. 
the1 weren't all by the official staff, like Brooks said. 
HF - Was his included in here about SanClemente [ 1] 
JM - ·!!es, I am not sure about. that. 
TR - Did Brooks do that by hiimsel.f"? 
JM - I think Brooks did it himself. 






Could I go back one step bef'ore that first meet~? T was going thru some 
notes that I made during the time on July 18th. We had baseball practice, 
Tom, at 8 o'clock and 10 o' cloc,M I think it was the second time I had 
talked with you during the entire proceeding, Walter, and I know you [TR] 
had talked with Flowers and Mann. They would like to get together with 
six to eight people and discuss in.formally the sta.ndarrus tp be used, 
evidence, etc. ~-,~ 
WF - And that was just standing in the committee room •••• 
JM - I remember precisely the way it was: we were standing between the two 
aisles Lin the Committee RoomJ . 
/ 
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WC - And Flowers says, I want to be sure we are not going to lose this thing 
on the noor if I vote for impeachment. You got to have a !olld case. 
Mann says we got 9e,, of the evidence. Flowers saia, you may have 105'1 
of the evidence, because some of this could never be used as evidence in 
the Senate. That was the line of conversation, which we then discussed-. i~• 
I said that there are only two areas of impeachment, agency abuse ~_..:-1"'r'""~ 
obstruction or justice. Jim Mann agreed. Not Cambodia, a.llewancca [? J, 
not the sale of a.lllbassadorships--that has been done by ever, administration. 
That was standing right there in front of the committee room. 
iiF - On the Republican side. 
JM - No; it was on the Democratic side. 
HF - No, _i~ was on the Democratic side. 
CB - I don't remem~r being present at that conversation. 
JM - No, you weren't. 
WC - I said I · had some problems with the wiretaps being left !or 22 months. 
Walter said that they would have been derelict if they didn't try to 
plug the leaks and then Mann and Flowers and I left so we could get back 
together without the hard cores. And you mentioned something, Walter, 
Kalmbach .made a case on milk[?] •••• 
WF - You're jogging my mind. That same day, at a subsequent r ·ou call, you 
apparaently mentioned that conversation to Caldwell Butler, because the 
next ime the committee reconvened and I sat out, Caldwell got up and came 
over to me and said something about. maybe we are going to have a meeting 
-some words to that effect. Do you remember? 
CB - I remember initiating a conversation with you sometime, but. rJTY' recollection 
is that ,I would have been talking with Cohen all the time. I also had 
a conver~tion with Jerry Waldie. You told ll"Je, riding over in the trolly 
one day about. the meeting-after the Doar articles came out. 
JM - Yes, it was. 
CB - That adght nan beeu after the Waldie conversation. 
JM - At that time I do not know if he had talked to the Democratic members •••• 
'#F - One interesting thing-I can't put a date on it. In ~lking to Waldie, 
who sat next to me, when I was particularly troubled and didn't really 
have any ideas who was backing what two or three weeks from the date we 
finally put it together, I asked, "Jerry, howmany are ·.-going to vote for 
impeachment?" He said, "I figure 26 or 27." And I remember how- ridiculous 
I felt that was t hen. I felt that was absolutely absurd. 
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JM - Two little items of interest. In spite of our chit-chat during the 
previous two weeks when things had _kinda started jelling, we never made 
a committment to each other, or had expressed any indication, frankly, 
as to what we were going to do. We just knew we were thinking that it 
was disturbing us all in the same way-the same things were disturbing us. 
I had an interview Friday, a couple of days ago, with the little fellow 
with the glasses that represents Newsday ••• Mike Waldman. Ee proably 
came to see most of us to get recollections a year later. But he 
reminded me that on Saturday when the Judiciary Committee had its 
informal session, he ran into you [WF] and me in the cafeteria, and 
at that point I ahd told him that we were going to start to work on some 
articles of our own. 
WF - Yeah, I remember that now; I had forgotten that. 
WC - And that Saturday there were only two or three Republicans around. 
HF - You had a cha~e to look at the articles prepared by the inquiry staff 
and perhaps thought they were not satisfactory'? 
JM - I hava to admit it is rrr:, nature to start from scratch when I :: am doing 
something, and so I didn't go back to look at these things and compare 
them with even what we ended up doing. But we met and we so quickly 
jelled on what the issues were that we didn't need to go back and fidlle 
with some factional things; we were just going to do those. 
WC - The phrase I recall you using, Walter, was, "Let's take the thing and 
shake it down and let the piecee fall to the ones we can agree on. Let's 
get all this evidence and shake it down and wee what are the areas we 
really' agree on here." 
CB - When was that? 
· ·· · ., WC · :_ That was the meeting in Rails' office on Tuesday morning. 
WF - It didn't take long to get there, did it? 
TR - . Before we get there, I think that Ham, you [iiC ] , and I and Caldwell 
did have lunch. Thj,s was about two weeks earlier in the Members' 
diningroom. Ai that point I had no idea that Caldwell was about to 
even consider voitng for impeachment. It was a chance meeting. 
'iiC - No, it wasn't. That was the day we had the 'blowup with Hutchinson, 
and Caldwell was not there. 
CB - I waan't back to the caucus, but I was back there to lunch. 
WC - That's right. That was the day we: were all upset when Hutchinson said, 
"Let's find out who is going to vote for impeachment." AS-4' .said, "I 
don't know how I am going to vote." /tJW'\-
CB - Hamilton and you and I had lunch and Rails came in with somebody and 
joined us later. 
~ 
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'.iF - I think this was part of the immense burden that we were carrying in 
that period of time, because you Republicans had the same thing. You 
would vote for impeachment and thereby make it legitimate for every aon 
of a Republican to look at it closely. Rails, you are out there in 
the midwest, Ham and Bill up East, and you, Bill, a first-termer at 
that time, and you, Ham, your dad was a Congressman and a noted Con-
servati ve. Everybody had adii'ferent kind of burden that they were 
carrying, but it vas not just your own bulk that you were really in 
control · of, but a whole lot of things on top of yours. 
HF - Bill Cohen has remained silent, but we met every Wednesday evening 
with the Wednesday group which at htat time was some 33 members, I 
think. The normal practice was everybody- contributing to the dis-
cussion, but that was put aside for a much more detailed report on 
what happened in the intervening week, and Bill had the labor there 
to keep the group abreast, so that they were pretty well informed. 
WC - They were informed. But I will tell you what the problem was. Walter, I,. V 
you point to me-I carried very little weight bascia.J.ly, no matter llimt A4.) 
I voted. It would have little impact, except maybe on a few of the 
younger members in the Wednesday group. That was the hard reality, so 
far as I was concerned, and if" I was to J,ia ~ part d this, I had 
to somehow hold Rails.... ~APt. '""' 
LAUGHTER 
TR - You know something? He never treated me · better and he hasn't since 
either. You were pretty- nice to me all during those troubled days. 
WF - They all gave us a wide berth during that period of time, didn't they-? 
Even yesterday, Jack Brooks and I were sitting next to each other in 
the subcommiteee meeting and he said, "I know vhat you all were up to, 
Flowers, you bastard, you and those other guys had 1~ of the stock 
and you were voting the whole corporation!" 
LAUGHTER 
WC - Oddly enough, Tom was not a member of the Wednesday group; Caldwell ~ 
now is. What was important, Tom, about your role was_.1'll,a.t 7ou ca.,; ~..c.._ ·, 
in and addressed the Wednesday group after speaking~ Sperlinglj(~~\ 
That was important, because it was one thing for me to sit around saying, 
"Look, these are what the !acts are." Frankly, the Wednesday grout 
was not inclined to support impeachment~ Guys like Bill Frenzel [?] 
said, "What the hell are y-ou guys doing? You're taking too long. 
It's all circumstantial evidence •••• " And he's a fairly enlightened 
modern type. He would say, "You're dragging your feet-you have't 
got a case-you guys are going to put us in a box." It was just 
disbelief at that point. And .you, Tom, were the one who gave it 
credibility I guess. Tom, y-ou have to verify this, but I recall you 
came in on a Tuesday morning, and y-our words were, "OK, I have only 
a few minutes, so let me fly vith this thing." Then you laid out 
all the allegations which you thought would warrant impeachment. And 
that was a kind of stimulus to that group. "Yes, it is not all cir-
cumstantial, for RAils is in-then it must be more than just Cohen." 
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TR - That morning we didn't make him [Nixon] a part o! the break-in or any-
thing else, but what we did is what we did later: we shoved that he 
had lied. You kmow that was the case against him, he lied and we had 
the facts to document. it. 
WF - You all had a lot more scheduled meetings than we did. I remember one, 
Jim, that just ca.me to ey mind then. Ray, I think you were there, too. 
Southern Democrats were oragnized thru that little research organization. 
Nobody was hardly there but there were 8 or 9 gu;ys that were in a 
boxed up tille .frame with the votes going on. W'e were in some meeting 
room in RAyburn and they all wanted us to tell them what was going on, 
and we kind of put them on notice that there was a distinct possibility 
that the President. of the U.S. was going to be impeached by our vote 
as well as by the Waldies and Drinans-and I think it started them just 
that quickly to think most seriously then. 
TR - Can I just add one thing that I think is very significant as far as the 
Republicans are concerned? I think it helped us, and certainly gave me 
some support, that I was ... ~~ting with George Bush, the Republican 
National chairman from the very . inception and keeping him informed, and 
I think that helped to moderate his position. And I r; nal 17 started 
meeting with my .friend, Bob Michael, who is now the Whip, to tell him 
what I thought and where there were problems. I met twice with John 
Rhodes. He had finally a case of laryngitis, because he didnt 't want 
to talk. All of' a :rndden, he was worrying. But I don't know if that 
helped us, because we had a communications problem. 
WC - Tom, I think the members on our side were always fearful that you might 
go for imfeachment, and what that would mean on the floor. The whole 
st~tegy was to kind of hold you in line, isolate me, and kind of' 
discredit me once that was done. 
TR - And Ham too. They were a little worried about him, too. 
WC - That's right. 
HF - But yuu must remember that none of the Members spoke to me about that. 
The closest I got to Rhodes was the series of leade·rship meetings we had 
starting back in April. 
RT - We sure had no pressure •••• 
TR - There was very little external pressure from any of our colleagues, 
even from the White House. I didn't get any from the White House. 
WC - The pressure was different, it was peer pressure, Tom. I -disagree .with / 
you about the meetings-I didn't !'ind them to be very beneficial at all, 
with the l~ership sitting around a table and say, "OK, geys, what's 
happening?l.Jhen have H~chinson burp his way thru _the meeting-that was 
pretty gross. LAUGHTER..:J And sit around and have Sandman carrying on, 
and then say, "Well, gee, whose left here, no one is speaking up." No 
one whould really raise their voices except one guy, Wiley Mayne, who 
said something in one meeting where Rhodes had said, "Let's not get into 










this whole personal tax thing." Mayne said, "Well, wait a minute, 
if there is fraud in the taxes, that would clearly be an i.lI:peachable 
offense." That was said in one of the early meeil"'.gs. Beyond that, 
no one got up and raised their hands and said, "Wait a minute, I thnnk 
he has done something wrong." 
I think it was obvious from our silence that those who did s~ak were 
not speaking for all of us and I think that Rhodes at least kept loose 
as a result of those meetings. I agree with you, we did not speak out. 
The purpose was to pull us in with a kind of herd instinct. 
Let me ask this, you gcys: how many of your colleagues on t he Republican 
side did you think were in their own way in and i.1'1 their own mind corm:nitted 
against impeachment, regardless of what the evidence would have shown? 
That is a doggone tough question to aak, because what you are asking 
us to do •••• The evidence we had obviously satisfied us, but I would 
almost guess that had we the June 23rd tape, the one that came out 
after the fact, and after the whole momentum was in our direction, it 
would not have made much difference to some guys. Would they have come 
along even then? I don't think so. That June 23rd tape by itself did 
not make that much diff ere nee. 
I hadn't thought of that. Well, all of them fell in after the fact. 
Let us say if the June 23rd tape had been lost in the other evidence, 
the sercalled smoking gun, had been lost in the other evidence, just a 
part of it, rather than singled out after the fact, as the way it came 
to us, I'm not sure •••• 
I think it would have been rationalized away just like everything else 
that came out. 
It might have brought along one or two others. It was an obTious 
prevarication that he got himself into that shape. You know ·that the 
President way lying, and here he is now - they had no choice. But i1' L 
they had not put themselves out on that limb by hanging the:nselves so 
much on those smoking guns.. • • I think you' re right, Bill, there are a 
lot of them still rationalizing themselves. , 
(,Jo.' 
I thought thru this whole thing, and take the March 21 tape. Their S:~t 
whole thrust was this is the first time that the President re~ 
any knowledge and was starting to get into it. People__..ljJfe 
would come in and testify, "I talked to Kleindi~ in SanClemente 
in April, '73, and it appeared to me that this is the first time he had 
arry knowledge about all this." We were just getting into it and then 
McClory would say, "Well, accourding to your testimony today, this 
is the first time that Ehrlichman had any awareness of all this," and 
O'Brien said, "Yes, or course." And the transcript was sitting there 
in front of O'Brien. But it is this kind of attitude that could 
rationalize anything away, as long as they had time to think about it. 
You could even take the March 21 tape, and by the afternoon session 
change that around and "it is not altogether clear." 
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CB - Besides, it is not admissable evidence. 
HF - To support that, I think that Wiggins and I were the onlJ' two members 
of the committee who were present at a meeting after the vote, between 
then and the release of the June 23rd tape, in Rhodes' office with a 
peculiar group. It was just a group of Republicans, not ju.st the lead-
ership, and we vere talking at that time about having meetings with the 
Republican memebers in the next couple of weeks before the proceedings 
started in the full House. Wiggins kept referring only to the March 21 
period or after, and I __ think at another time he referred to Dick Cates' 
anal.7sis of the events of June and July as only a theory. 
TR - Yeah, only a theory. 
HF - I think 7ou are right: I think he did zerl> in on the March 21 tape--
it wasn't conclusiTe, it wasn't satisfactory, taerefore •••• 
TR - But there were two different rationales used to get away fro11 the 
evidnce for impeachment. One of them was without a doubt . held by 
some of the guys, that other presidents had done this--in other words, 
the Mayne thesis. Wilie said, "Look, they're hanging just this guy, 
and LBJ was even worse. Then the lawyers' argument, by Wiggins and 
Dermis, that there is no real truth • . In other words, the admissibility-
in the eTidentil..1"1' problems. So it was really two different rationales. 
WC - There were three. The otherone was the partisianship. I think I may 
have menti.nned to some of you--don't take offense, and I' ■ sure you 
won't-but at one time, ve: were getting ready to vote on a procedural 
matter which seemed to me to be eminently fair, and Harold Froelich 
was going to vote "no" on it, and I said, "Harold, this seems to be a 
fair procedure, don't you want. to suppori:, this~ And his answer I 
think captured the whole sense of tension between the two sides as to 
why there wasn't more or a concentration of effort. He said, "Bill, 
it is like the st.017 they tell o! the little girl who wanted to go to 
heaven. The teacher asked the class, 'How macy in the classroom want 
to go to heaven?' And everyone but Mar,. raised her hand. And she 
said, "What is the matter, Mary, don't you want to go to heaven?' 




And that real.i,- was the feeling on our side; they wanted to do the 
right thing, they wanted procedural fairness. 
Another good one! 
They wanted procedural .fairness, they wanted to see if he was guilty, 
to convict him of impeachable offe~ and Sf.,. forth, but there was 
that underlying feeling that il ~ was ii/i other way around that 
if a Democratic Presidnet was sitting in that office that day~ you 
could have the same facts, ~ you wouldn't have any committee heari~s 
going on right now. I,~ 
/ 
/ 
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HF - Do you have notes about the beginning hour of that morning session? 
TR - I don't. 
WC - Just a point of interest: it's ironic that the setting was al.most 
identical to this one today in that room. 
All - Yeah. 
WC - I was sitting behind Railsback' s desk with l1G" feet on the desk. The 
Danish weredown at the end of the table on the other side and you were 
ove+ there in the corner, 1ou were on the right side, •••• [indicating 
each]. 
RT - We sat ourselTes down here today in the same order without thinking about it~· 
TR - Except I was right up there. 
TM - But we had the long table there. Bill Hermelin and I ran around to find 
. out . how we were going to get a table into that room so that we could 
all sit and work from it. A.t the last minute he was calling the cw,-
todian or whateTer and we f'i nal 1 y got a table. He also ordered up 
some Danish and we had coffee. 
WF - Who paid for that-Railsback? 
TM - You [TR] must have. It may still be outstanding. 
LAUGHTER. 
TR - Now that you mentimt it.... I remember throwing a Danish to Cohen right 
in front of me on this table. 
WC - I was giving Rails a tough time. M;y r eet were up on his desk and I sat 
there and you took the Danish at that point and threw it. 
TM - Youmissed and hit the window. 
WC - I think the attitude t:'"'lg'alked in there with was this-we were all 
-~ saying how quick17 it oiled down to a c1111p:1.e el c_,2nsensus .. we ,, .., e.o:;r.~ ha~ When we were being errteved a!'terwards-Jia llaughton did an 
,~,_.':!!.> • )i"'ticle in the New York Times-we were 11 l Cl dub.itf the terrible seven, 
· remember that?-t.Jnd I said, "No, it is not really 'l .. :,errible seven, it 
was more like ,c magnificent seven!" Remember the ~ old IIO'Vi.e where 
A ere were seven guys each representing a different constituency all athered together in this one spot. without ever sqing a word? They all •lllllia knew the,- had soae kind or job to do. They all met in-.thi~ one 
place and there was a consensus immediately. 'Ph• they wv rd it be 
~811 ibis bab mg,ti~iHM sewn. And it was that kind of attitude that 
we had when we walked in and looked around. There was re~ not all 
that much to talk about except hov do you put it all together in the 
right language. 
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LAUGHTER. 
CB - And then we had a procedural discu.ssion on the problems of how we rlll 
vote when it gets to the floor. The group of us recognize that i! we 
hang to~ether and work on something together we can control the rules 
and actions on the articles of impeachment, and so we pretty much agreed 
that we are going to try to draft them. Jim Mann is going to work on 
the area of abuse of power and RailsbacK and Cohen on the obstruction of 
justice. I guess I'll be working with them and Mooney-. So ve discussed 
drafts and read them over, kicked it around, and sort of agreed that 
we'd look at it again before that evening. We are going to meet again 
afeer ve get thru our meeting tonight. We rejected the possibility 
of inviting Harold Froelich because he had told~ that the Republicans 
and he didn't want to improve on the defective articles. He wanted 




We Republicans here feel that is wrong. And we did not invite Henr;y 
Smith because we felt he was a hopeless case. 
Caldwell, could I interrupt right there on the Froelich thing? In ..,-
notes, we had a leadership meeting right around the same time, either J 
a few days before or after, in which Froelich made the Jtatement that 
the Democrats are going to come llp with a piece offshit and we are 
going to clean it up !or them. ';tr (!.~ ..,::;;, 
That's right. 7 ,, C~ ~ -psi f~" 
WC - Remember, you said, "Yeah, you [Froelich] would pr9'bably- vote for it." 
He said, "Yeah, probably- I will." 
TR - Yes, that's right. /{,.. 
CB - He said he was tired of us cleaning up their s~. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - The only' show in town when 7ou ~ have got a majority. 
LAUGHTER. 
CB - The only' note I have is that we did not invite Larry Hogan because we 
thought he was going on his own and va-sn•t really troubled by the things 
that were troubling us. He had other problems, like being governor. 
00 - Let me ask a question here that we forgot in the individual interviews. 
Did the prospect of a non-elected vice-president, in this case Ford, ner 
play acy part in making you a little 1110re hesitant? 
TR and All - No, I don't think so. 
CB - I don't even remember that question coming up. It is about as relevant 
now as it was then. 
,., 
t, 
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J1d - There is one other commendable reason for the lack of organization. 
If I had been cha.ri.man of that comnittee, I would have orchestrated 
that television presentation for the American people. I would have 
had the evidence laid right out and preseented in that moderate 
fashion. And the fact that it vasn •t done is co11111endable in so far 
as the chairman of the eomittee and John Doar are concerned. But 
on the other hand, as a good lawyer, as you say, it should have bemi 
colated and correlated with the specific allegations. It wasn't, so 
we were caught short. We did a pretty good job of getting it to-
gether on short notice. 
RT - Great broken-field runners. 
WC - Can I come back to the important point that Tom Mooney- made? As you 
recall, John Doar shifted when he finally made his presentation - he 
dropped the position of simply being a non-partisan collator of facts 
and he tried to make a veI7 drama.tie presentation which I thought fell 
fiat on its .face. But you remember, Tom, the reaction of the Republcarus 
in the committee who were just outraged at that point when Doar suddenly 
was now an advocate and not simply gathering the facts? Then when 
Jenner went along with it, they said, "Wait a minute, this is not 
supposed to be." 
WF - Dld you glJY'S get disturbed by that? 
WC - Our side got de.finitely disturbed. 
WF - I thought, it was highly appropriate that John Doar did w~ he did. 
WC - Not on our side - our side was violently opposed. 
CB - No, it didn't bother me. 
WC - Rails was a great supporter of Jenner. 
TR - Yes, there was a reaction. It just built itself up. Jenner was a 
great lawyer. 
WC - I said something to the effect - I recall it because it was quoted in / 
the Times - that there was a dramatic shift in Doar' s presentation 
• ('from a simply- non-patisan gathering of evidence with a eo1J111ittee. The 
1,1,,.,'4 iPfeneRCe that the Republicans were laboring under was that he was just ·,~, going to present this and we:. w~ going to put itall together somehow 
on our Olf?l, and if it shakes down to impe.achment, OK. Blit Doar was 
never to become an advocate, nor was Jenner. And when Jenner went 
along with Doar, that was the final straw. They said, all right, get 
rid of Jenner. And they canned him, made him cercounsel with Doar. 
So that was a pretty strong reaction. · 
WF - Backing up a little from that - I remember someone s¢ng something 
about falling nat. I thought the nattest thing I had ever seen fall 
was the so-called reply of St .Clair when he got the floor afier the 
months of John Doar' s presentation. When he slipped in that matter 
of .fact little piece of evidence really prejudiced his case so 
much! That is when I said, "My" God, the President. is treating this ~ · 
just like he did all these other people;" I couldn't believe that a 
first-class lawyer was going to pull a trick like hhat. 
,, 
\ 
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TM - For the second meeting of the coalition, I came up with draft five, and 
to this moment, I have not been able in my own mind satisfactorily to 
conclude whether or not the group met Tuesday afternoon. The first 
meeting was with the .de.finite intent of getting back together at some 
point. I recall drafting in MY' office when Railsback called and asked, 
"Would Hutchinson fire you if he knew that you were working on articles 
of impachment ?" 
HF - Certainly. 
TM - And that kind of took me by surprise. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - Do you have any indication that he is thinking that way? 'What happened, 
I believe, was that one of the ~' s writers t Cannon, had contacted_ 
Railsback, saying he had learned that there is a group of rembers 
gathered and were drafting articles one and two. And that this was a 
quiet, silent, secretive group. By noon the press had had this and of 
course it ·was overshadowed that same day when Hogan had his press con-
ference and announced his position. · 
JM - As a JDatter of fact, after our first meeting, didn't we sneak out the 
back-door becasue the press was outside? 
RT - Right. _ 
WC - May _ I go thru m;y notes on what happened, Tom? That first meeting I 
arrivedabout 8:JO. It lasted to about 10:00. Railsback and I went 
to a caucus and we were late getting there. There was a ~mous 
consent that Garrison should take over as cheif minority counsel, and 
Railsback and I asked to be recorded as "no" on that. So at 10:00 
they were still caucusing with the Republicans there. 
HF - I was- not there with you at that time. 
CB - I wasn~t there either. 
WC - The meeting of the Judiciary Committee started at 10:30 or so. They 
were anxious to get the caucus over to get down to the meeting, and 
at 11:35 I .have a note here: "meeting of Judiciary started. A mess." 
"No one .knows what is going on." 
CB - It was supposed to be aninforma.l meeting. 
WC - At 11:35 Hogan received a call from Jerry Ford, the vice-president. 
~c -
TR - I don~.t -remember that. /Hogan had scheduled his press conference that 
afternoon, and he got up and walked out and then we had a general dis-
cussion. 
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A continuation of Tape I: those present, site, and time - same. 
HF - I sat right next to Dennis and Wiggins, and I had never seen two people, 
no matter what came up in that evidentiary presentation, who were less 
moved • 
TR - It seemed that St .Clair by his demeanor kinda acted like Wiggins should 
cave in.[?] 
WF - No, I think those guys and some other politicians had given him too 
much credit. I think we had virtue on our side. We had it. They knew 
it. Th,ey- were on a losing team, and they found SOllething they could 
grab hold of in St.Clair. 
CB - That's what I thought. 
WF - They got him where he [St.Clair] was the only one out there. 
TR - Carloe Morehead was another ••• 
HF - St.Clair killed himself. All that talk about national security •••• 
JM - I'd just sit and fume. 
WC - I was fuming all along. Caldwell and I were talking most of the time 
in this entire proceeding, and yet I didn't know what you [CB] were 
going to do. You shocked me one time on Kalmbach •••• I felt sorry for 
him. He was a pretty decent fellow, and he was on the rocks like 
everybody else. I heard your comments, Caldwell, you said, "Bullshit, 
he's stuped, (ven when they tell him what the facts a.---e, he would still 
simply go out and do it." Your reaction was that the guy is not that 
dumb. 
CB - That's right. 
iiF - You know I still can't beleve that they haven't indicted Bittman. 
TR - I don't get it either. 
CB - and o~Brien, that poor fellow. 
WF - It was the soldier with the commander-in-chief. Pat Gray was a 
political operative to start off rith. He wasn't a career civil 
servant.; I put the■ in a little dit'ferent category. In fact, Gray 
was not one of our witneasesand I never did see him in the place, so 
I didn't feel the same way about him as I did about Peterson. 
JM - Maybe not, but he was a career man, wasn't he? 
WF - Gray did something and then they wack him in as an FBI man - that 
was something! 
-
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TR - No, I met with Hogan that morning, Tuesday. I tried to convince not 
to come out against impeachment precipitously, and he would not give 
me any clue. I met with him in Mooney's office. 
WF - He was really playing games, wasn't he? 
TR - Yeah, he wouldn't give me an inkling what he was going to do. 
CB - Here izs waht my notes say about that meeting. Big news was that Larry 
Hogan is getting ready to have apress conference and announce how he i3 
going to vote. While he was sitting there the vice-president called 
him. There is a pre~ty little girl over there who is coming in and 
out and upsetting everybody, and she came in with the word !'or Hogan 
that the vice-president was calling him. Well, Larry was obviously 
a little bit upset. We knew the vice-presidnet was calling him and 
I will anxious to !ind out which way. He came back, and then went 
on and ■ade his statement. 
WC - That afternoon I had an interview with a guy from the Bangor Daily ✓ 
News that took 110st of the afternoon. Hogan at 3 :00 made his 
decision to vote for i~chaent and was immediately attacked by 
Dean B~ch,who was rurming the presidtmt' s campaj.gn, as a purely V 
political decision. I have here: at 5:20 we resU111ed a meeting and 
a reading of the resolutioo-that is a pretty cryptic thing-I am 
not sure which meeting we were referring to. · 
CB - I will tell . you - if you want me to interrupt -that was the business 
meeting where we decided on the rules of procedure. It was where we 
came in with our coaltion and we were going to take over and Tote 
on everything at one time at the end of it, and Kastenmeier said •••• 
WF - That afternoon earlier we had been in a Democractic caucus, backing 
Rodino. Don't you know that was a real heart-rending thing back there? 
CB - And that's why we didn't get together again that af:t,ernoon because we 
had to avoid the Democratic caucus. 
WF - We had made mre or less a ~t.t.mimt. to these gtJTS. We ~d handle 
the Democrats and we thought it was all in our best interests t.o Tate 
one time and not be peppered by the whole lot or 'em. I think 1 was 
thinking more about 70u than mvom else, Caldwell~ becauae, a11 I 
'Said, a pickup truck in RoatlOft can get up here in three hours. 
LAUGHTER. 
CB - I was on your side. 
WF - And only but a day to get up from Tuscaloosa. 
TR - And only two days from Moline. 
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TM - And then we moved on to the conclusion. 
HF - That is well supported in the commm:i.ttee report 'ey the extracts from 
the presidential utterances on television throughout the period of 
a year and a hel!. 
TR - Yeah. 
CB - They were all !ish in a barrel. 
TM - The concl.usion you get in draft 6 is somewhat different, quite different 
in fact, from draft 5. Looking at number 2 under points for discussion: 
" an unindicted co-conspirator" was listed in this conclusion and that 
generated some lively discussion, it is my recollection. 
TR - I surel.7 don't like it, I can tell you that. 
WF - Do you mean the question or whetaer we should leave it? I think we 
quickly came to the conclusion that it should not be in there. 
TR - Sure. 
iiF - We couldn't accept some other tribunal, which this grand jury was. 
JM - That is a detailed factual allegation, it has no charge •••• 
TR - That's right. 
HP' - Let's carrr that a little further, because we never really became 
public on this issue. · 
JM - Veil, we did. In all m,- crlll:i.nal. law experience I haYe drawn thausands 
of indict-,nts and that is wh7 I probably lll8Y be in a llli.nority on this. 
I think you have to allege general teras that deal with essential facts 
only - no details. I don't know how this got into the draft. 
HF - Is it not true that except for the fact that he was President of the 
United States, he would have been namd as a conspirator? Right? 
JM - Yes. 
HF - It would .have been done. 
TR - Is that from John Dear? 
JM - But on the legal question of whetaer the President can be indicted •••• 
WC -
,, " That was a totally inoperatiTe .!act. Do you recall in the Mitchell-
STans trial in New York, when they were found not guilty, the press 
canvassed us: what is your reaction? It has no bearing whatsoever. 
The fact that they were found not guilty does not infiuence srr action. 
And I said by the same token, if' they had been found guilty, it had 
no bearing. Ve cannot base our decisions on what somebody else does. 
v 
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WC - I had a different perspective on this .from the outset - on vhether or 
not a President could be held responsible for acts of agents, an agency 
theory. You simply can't have it both ways. You cou.lldn't do what 
Nixon was trying to do by concentrating all the now of the power thru 
Haldeman and Ehrlichman with the supercabinet that he had tried to 
develop and concentrate power in your executive office. And then when 
it came time to be accountable for what was happening,-"" be in a 
position to deny knowledge of whateTer they were doing. I didn't think 
they could have it both ways. I just felt you could not just set up 
this man; you had a positive duty to know what's going on. 
HF - I think it's grounded in the language of the Constitution: to "take 
care" in the oath of office. You cannot just walk away from it. 
TR - Can I just express 'fll1 different feeling about what yuu are saying? If 
I understand it, rq feeling is that under article II, he does have a 
duty to faithfully execute his office. My feeling is we could prove 
he had violated his oath of office, because he did or did not do certain 
things we could prove. W:e could proTe that he tried to misw,e the CIA, 
we c.ould prove he was a party to a ldsuse of the IRS, in other words, 
I am not conceding that a man can be impeached if his subordinates do 
something . completely without his knowledge, even if those acts are 
wrong. You might say he should ha.Te known, I a■ saying the bureau-
cracy is so big that I don't think we should impute that. 
WF - I don't think we disagree. He has a resonable duty to check on his 
subordinates. He can't substitute a lead wall between him and Haldeman 
and say it stops here. He has a duty to take care that his alter ego 
is doing what is right. 
TR - Then you are talking about misfeasance. 
WF - Appraoehing malfeasance. 
HF - He cannot position himself to avoid knowledge. 
WC - You are talking about an isolated example. Someone eOllll!i.ts an offense 
and it might be ·on your own staff' and 7ou don't know about it. How 
can they hold you accountable for it? That's not what we are talking 
about. This is where the "planN comes back. This was a course of action 
over a period of years, of holding meetings, and the tapes and so forth. 
That's what you have to consider. There is a difference, isn't there? 
The President used the word in his March 22, '73 discussion vith 
Mitchell: "up to now our plan has been one or containment" and with 
additional references to "we are adopting a new plan now" to .use 
executive privilege. That is how ve bailed you [TR] out. 
LAUGHTER. 
TM - Before the Thursday night meeting about article I, I had a difficult 
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DS - Yes, we had thought of that. Perhaps one of you could set the stage 
by writing to them. That is important to get their recollections. 
CB - When dii they join the group and so forth? 
HF - I heard Froelich on the floor of the House, just sitting there, saying 
to somebody - a kind of tip-of! to ae - several days before this, that 
he was really bothered by the interference with the agencies, particu-
larly the en. This was really the thing, it seemed. 
TR - Yes, that bothered him all right. 
TM - Do ;rou recall Wednesday afternoon, after the McCloey-Frank Polk call, 
I think, that we did talk about brining other people into the group 
and at that point 7ou ['?'R] got up fro■ the table and walked behind your 
desk and called Froelich? 
TR - Yes, I did. When I first talked to him, he did not respond a!firmantiTely, 
but he was not disinterested, in other_ words, he didn't turn it off but 
he couldn't come cm,r that first time I asked him. 
WF - Now Polle came in strieti,- at McClor,r' s request to do his vorlc, didn't 
he? He was working in McClorr's office. I hadn't known that before. 
HF - Yes, Frank Polle was working with ·MeClor,r. 
ltF - Polle sorta appeared with us fr011 then on, didn't he? He was veey helpful, 
too. 
TR - John Da:rlsson [?] - wasn't that his name? - wasn't he helping you and 
got into trouble over it? 
WC - I tried to get Dan4'son to prepare some stuff for me and Garrison found 
out about it, and asked him to step what he was doing or get off the 
staff. And I told him that Garrison did not have that power, ta.at he 
couldn't decamp at that point. He was to complete whatever I had asked 
him for. I was still doing the agency theor,r. 
DS - Was there a similar proba.e■ with Tom here? 
WC - No. See, he [TM] was not on the impeachment staff, while Davisson was. 
7 
✓ 
That became the question once Garruon succeed Jenner. I guess my 
antipathy to McCloey goes back to his shift around on a Friday. He wanted 
to take over the Republican leadership role and he was going to be the 
new leader of the Republican Party as such, and Hutchinson wa~r ·no longer. 
He would be ranking - it's been a long-standing thing, since Hutchinson 
and McClory came on the same year and nipped a coin and Hutchinson became 
ranking. 
TR - I didn't know that. 
HF - I didn't either. 
iiC - And because of the lack of leadership, McClory was simply gofM to take 
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JM - I am curious about one little situation that was alluded to this morning, 
and that is how Jerry Waldie comes off as a kind of good go;r in this 
deal in that Caldwell and others are communicating with him? 
CB - I spoke to him one time. 
WF - I was talking to him about what a gocid looking chick there was in the 
third row back there. 
JM - Somehow I had the sa11e recollection that Caldwell does - that is either 
Jerry and I were walking over talking about us getting together with 
the lowest colllllOll denominator idea, or that 118.Y'be it was after you 
spoke to Jerry that you came over and said, "Maybe I ought go and meet 
or something," and had I known that, I might have been ~picious. 
LAUGHTER. 
WF - Those guy-s were so anxious to get an article of impeachllent they would 
take it a:n::, wa:, they could get it. Waldie and that crowd were rea~ 
to illpeach Mixon on November 7, 1972. 
HF - 1 69. 
WF - 1 68, I guess, yeah, right after the election. 
WC - ~ ~obabl7 revealed wisdom. ✓ 
CB - One of the remarkable things was that all of tbose gentlemen had such 
restraint when they got on national television. 
HF - Was there some control? Did the word go out that Drinan and Conyers 
and those guy-s were supposed to be quiet during this thing? 
JM - It wasn't expressed in our pre-sence, but I have got the distinct im-
pression that there must have been a little rump session somewhere 
with Rodino maybe, putting Conyers particularly and one or two others 
under control. 
'WF - I think the others were pretty much capable of exercising some 
discretion. Except Drinan, and the guy they were more fearful of 
than aivbo:dY else, Seiberling, because he has got diarhea of the 
mouth. 
JM - Exactly. 
LAUGHTER. 
'WF - He can't stop when he gets started, and he doesn't know where he is 
going to end up anymore than a man in the moon. You can have a full-
grown idea in John Seiberling, vhere he knows exactly what he is 
supposed to do rith it, and he will be turned acound 180 degrees in 
three seconds, won't he? 
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iiF - All during that period when he and Hutchinson were going thru the trans-
cripts hours and hours each day, it kind of boggles the mind - them not 
communicating at all, doesn't it? 
LAUGHI'ER. 
CB - And those insidi~ re11arks about the Italian-Americans, you know. 
RT - It's been mentioned on numerous. occasions, but I think deserves repetition 
here, that one of the key decisions made by the leadership vas to have 
the inquiry conducted by the Judiciar:, Committee, rather than forming a 
special blue ribbon connittee for that purpose. It may well be that by 
letting that burden fall on a committee which was not specifically 
selected for that purpose, you got among that committee a group of 
people who approached the problem as those here and some others on the 
committee did appraoch it - namely, tr,yi.ng to do so objectively. I 
think that was possibly one of the key decisions of the entire process. 
JM - I don't think we can overemphasize two things: one, the fact that 
Rodino did not do any- a.rm-twisting with the individual members or the 
colllllittee to rzq knowledge, and tvo, that the Democrats did not act ·, 
in concert on but very, very few issues - the only one I can really 
recall is when we recessed the meeting and went back and had a little 
brain session and came back and voted the other way. But otherwise not. 
WF - We were not in concert even then; I was on the other side of that issue. 
JM -:- Yes, but it was about the only part of the "plan" that I can recall. 
w'F' - It was a 20 to 18 vote. 
JM - Now you Republicans had a little difficulty understanding that. 
TR - Well, I rill tell you, Ji■, that is not exactly right. There were some 
procedural things where we got into fights about •••• 
HF - Early on, too. 
WC - Let me tell you that I think Rodino almost blew it one time. That was 
at the beginning of the issue or St. Clair's participation in the 
sessions. You recall that was very crucial as far as the Republicans 
were concerned. The Democrats mostly sai~~t time that St.Clair 
can't come in, you can't cross-examine. issue erupted~Well, 
Peter was out.side the speaker's lobby one ti~ and advised me\'that 
they were not going to allow St.Clair to actively participate \and I 
said, "Veil, Peter, if you take that position, yuu had better 
about any bi-partisan approach to this whole thing." 
TR - Sure. s~-~fj 
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WC - Virtual.17 nothing. 
WF - Compared with what the Senate did in about the same amount of time, you 
know, thank God that the Senate cut the 11ustard, because we borrowed of 
their investigaiive work all the way, all the way. 
WC - The fact of the matter is, there would never have been an impeachment 
process if you didn't have the Senate's work. 
WF - And the' tapes. 
WC - And Sirica, because what other judge would have given out 35 year• , 
provisional sentences provided you talk - not too 88.1V' that I a.a aware of. 
WF - You all remember the matter that preceded impeachment t?8'l think had 
something to do with the ultimate outcome. And I' 111 going to make 117self 
a hero here, but Ji11 just got caught in the crack th.ere. I refer to 
the matter of the Hungate subcOllllllittee trying to backtrack on Jaworski. 
You reme■ber that? The comrittee voted on partisan lines except me 
voting with 7ou gu;ys, 20 to 18, to report out a bill that would have re-
quired a new special prosecutor. 
RT - A court-appointed special prosecutor. 
WF - Which in effect would have voted Jaworski out, and they neTer even 
brought it up. 
().;, 
WC - Well, I don't want to engage in any self-nlPotheosis either, but you may 
recall it did come out of the full commit{~ to go to the House. 
WF - It was never brought up in the House. 
WC - No, but they passed it out of our committee, it went to the House. 
And I had the opportunity to write an article which the ~ printed, 
and wrote an editorial one or two days before it came out, saying, "Don't 
do it, don't put a new man in." M;r reasons were entirely different. 
I had been talking with Elliot Richardson, dl,ove him in from his house 
✓ 
one day to downtown, and asked him about what the situation was with ✓ 
Jaworski. What had happe..21,~~ lh~e White House originally intended 
when the,. fi:re'li Richardson lrnf"" gel rid' of Cox and Ruckelshaus, they 
expected Peterson and Bork'\o take over the prosecution. And when tha~ 
didn't fly' after about two days of public vitriol being expressed, they ./ 
decided they had to come up vith some guy :;r They picked Jaworski with / 
a long, safe tradition, Saeed ei +.i,e 1\a.\,tpresident o! the ABA, chances 
are, representing a lot of corporate fat~& • 
WF - A wolf in sheep's clothing. 
WC - OK, when they appointed him, they expec~ed him to,can all o! Cox's men. 
He didn't do that, so once he came in, he then became the captive of 
Cox's staff, and that is why the White House was upset with him. They 
expected him to fire everybody, bring in his own people and start fresh. 
So now he couldn't back away !rom any issue that Cox had begun without 
them blowing the whistle. So the White House wanted him out, and that 
is the article that I wrote ~ar the Post~ saying vbT )"Oil ~hculdn'-t C"U'te -a new special prosecutor. 
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HF - We might just conte~late what dii"ference it is nov fro■ a -rear ago: 
two to one plus one - there is a lot of difference between that and 
21 to 17. 
JM - There sure is. 
TR - Peter was trring to control the crazies. 
CB - I don't think the matter would have been referred to the present com-
mittee, do you? 
HF - It might have been. But the Republicans would not have been shown all 
these considerations. 
CB - Well, I !eel that now it is not that representative of enn the whole body. 
SL - What if Cellar had still been chairman? 
WF -
iiC - What if Jack Brooks had been chairaan? /If Cellar had been chairllan, it 
don't think he would have brought it along. He would haTe stifled it 
somehow or another. I don't think he ever thought that Hixon should have 
been iape.ached. What do you all think? 
TR - I just saw hira the other night. He is looking senile. Good gcy. 
LAUGHTER. • n .,,.'1,.~ 
WC - A Railsback remark. 
A 
re - On that autobiographical remark [TR - That was great, thank 7ou. J ~ I 
would like to make one more comment. Do you recall that in most of 
your interviews, I told that little analogy of Lincoln saying that 
if you want to stop religion or a church - well, this is the time to 
give the credit to the real author, Ray Thornton. Tell 'em right. 
APPLAUSE. 
RT - If you want to stop the construction of a church, don't start an argUJnent 
with the religion, but over the location of the building. 
DS - We showed that again tonight. Shall we adjourn? You know t he agenda for 
tomorrov • 
END OF TAPE J:V AND OF SESSION II. 
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TR - Ray, if you'll yield. I want to congratulate and compliment your state-
ment, which I thought was excellent, and this is very, Tery important, I 
think, in our meeting this morning. I don't agree rith you, but I thought 
your statement was just excellent. As far as going to court, I was voted 
down, you know; I think we got six votes to go to court. 
RT - Reasonable men can disagree. 
TR - But I just wanted to add a postscript: that Alex Bickel, vho I think knows 
more about it than Bill Cohen - he was a hell of a great constiuutional 
e.xpert -
CB - I hope so. 
WC-He~ 
✓ 
TR - about ten days after that · vote was t ·aken, came out with an article that 
said that we should have gone to court. Very strongly arguing from a 
constitutional standpoint and then shortly thereafter he died. But there 
was a very important part of the precedent-setting •••• 
WC - Being punished, probably. 
CB - The whole question that you are directing us to is really that we didn't 
just go far enough down the road. 
TR - No, two things, altho that was part of it. We didn't exir1...ast our tradi-
tional remedies. In not exhausting them, we in effect, took away some of 
the rights of our due process that I think are guaranteed to other possible 
persons to be held in contempt, in other words, witnesses. We didn't prtr 
tect them by us seeing that they had the traditional rights. And the 
second part is executive privilege. All during these proeedings, the 
Presidnet was arguing executive privilege. That is where you get into 
the court tests. Is it proper to test that argument by going to court? 
I think we would ha.Te won and settled it. I think the Supreme Court 
would have held that we did have a right, and executive privilege would 
give way in that case. We did not see fit to do so. 
CB - And summarily so. 
WC - I think your position was best expressed on page 16 in the report where 
it reads, "Before the President's refusal to comply with committee sub-
peonas can be raised to the ·1evel of an impeachable offense, the com-
mittee at a minimum should wait until the House of Representatives has 
found that non-compliance tobe wilful, contemptuous, and illegitimate. 
Since the committee did not pursue this course of action, it should not 
now seek to raise non-compliance to the level of a separate and independent 
act." 
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HF - But by then the Hom,e would not have voted articles of impeachment. 
CB - But he argument that you keep advancing is the failure to cooperate and 
to comply with the subpoena is of itself impeachable, and if that is the 
case, you can hang a man not for the crime but the .failure to cooperate 
in his impeachment as such. 
WC _'\ou could do it, but it would be wrong.~ .. You're saying "crime".... ~ 
A ~ 
CB - I'm m,i.ng the word rather loosely. 
RT - The point is, wheteer there is an attack on the constitutional system of 
government itself, at least that is vhat I think it is. That is what the 
question is. If there is some etlderu:e to support the idea that the 
President is about to dissolve the Congress by an executive proclamation, 
because it is nm longer needed to carry out the affairs of the United 
States, and if the Congress hears of it and has some reasonable basis 
to conduct. an inquiry as to whether the President is indeed about th 
issue such an order, I think the Congress would have a right to inquire 
into it and to subpoena whateTer documents the Congress needs to deter-
mine whether he is about to dissolve it. And if the President refuses 
to honor that subpoena, even by the production of ex culpatory material, 
then I think he has committed an impeachable offesne, because he is in 
effect denying to the Congress the sole power of impeachment. 
WF - You can make the analogy in our work just as well, Ray, you don't have 
to make up this story. Let's say that he had just totally refused to give 
us a damn thing, totally, and the courts had not come to our aid on the 
tapes, but they just stood mute totally and disregarded it, were would 
we have gone? 
CB - If they had denied jurisdiction •••• 
WF - Yeah, what we are saying is, what would we have done if ·•e hadn't had 
the tapes? 
HF - The situation in India today, by vi..-y-t,ue of having the majority of parlia-
ment, the prime minister ean incarcerate political enemies. Now if this 
started happening here, and we did not have the impeachment power, we'd 
be in the position of the parliament o! India. 
CB - If you don't have enough evidence to impeach the President aside from he 
has in his own limited domain, then you got no business impeaching him. 
HF - Even if you have identified with precision, as we did, the tape, the hour 
on which it was on tape, the people present at the conversation - not 
just a fishing expedition? 
CB - You' re entitled to access to it, but you are not entitled to impeach him 
for invoking executive privilege. 
RT - I just don't think that executive privilege applies in an impeachment pro-
cess to the extent that it does in the normal legislative process. 
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WC - My concern was that we had, in r:ry opinion, a fair and ~ impartial / 
investigation. Let us suppose you go back to the Johnson impeachment. 
You got people llke Benjamin Butler leading a charge against the President, 
not, in 1ll1' opinion, on valid grounds, but for purely political reasons. 
Say you have a heavy majority in Congress who is opposed to the presi-
dential policies, whether it be impoundment or dismantelling of OEO, or V 
/whatever, suddenly saying, "Here are our subpoenas,~~ got to bring it 
V in or otherwise ~ach you." d f\,4.'•i.. 
JM - That' s the danger. 
CB - Suppose you had two to one plus one. 
RT - That is exactly the hypothesis that Raoul Berger poses in discussing 
judicial review. And I want to say that your posiiion see11S to me to be 
identical with President Ford's in the Douglas case - that impeachment 
is whateTer you make it. Let me tell you Berger took Ford to task there. 
HF - You raise a good point, just make it two to one plus one, three to one 
totally politially' hatchet job. But first of all, we do have a standard 
of what constitutes an impeachable offense, and what you're saying would 
not measure up. 
TR - You disagree with Ford, then? 
iiiF - I also disagree with it. 
HF - Secondly, to see your argument, you have this impeachable offense whihh 
is a crime against the government, the structure of the Constitution, and 
so forth. Clearly what you are saying it would not be that, but never-
theless, the Senate votes it, the trail held, and they convict the civil 
officer. Now the court of review is the pe~ple of the United States in 
the next election, as it is in so ma.my of the things we do. You are 
posing a most extreme position, a most extreme breakdown in the civilities 
that are essential to our system. 
WF - I agree with you,Ham. The only and final recourse is the people. 
TR - Ham, you are stating the argument very well. I think it is veey important. 
w'F - I think you could have a totally- political impeachment. 
TR - Sure, that's possible. 
WF - When you get down to it, the system is no better than the people that are 
operating it. If you had even two to one plus one Republican, that could 
impach a Democratic President. 
CB - They would. 
r:6 - That was Butler for the record. 
LAUGHTER. 
., 
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TR - I doubt it. 
RT - After the later eve!!ts, I think it might have. I believe after the 23rd 
tape, if that had not been followed by resignation. 
CB - I thought about that since you asked me the other question the other day. 
I feel that it would not have passed the House, because the pride of the 
Judiciary Committee was at stake when we passed article III thru the -
committee, but the pride of the House would not have been there, and for 
that reason I don't think the House would have had the same feeling. 
WF - Good point. It would .have made a difference whether the three of us would 
have been on the same side of it, too. I think if Jim and I had changed 
at that point, the southern Democrats would have gone along with us. Don't 
you think so? If we hadn't, it would have been a divided thing. 
HF - Aren't we still talking about the possibility in terms of the Haus~, that 
it might amend I and II ourselves to insert the essence of III? 
RT - Bill and I had agreed that if it came to the floor, we would ~.ake an 
effort to add article III to preferably I. 
HF -
WC -
There is another thing that I noted in rrry talk about that article. I 
actually put the question to McClory. That we were still hoping that 
the President was coming across with the documents, the Supreme Court 
decision had made it seem perhaps that we would get some more subpoenaed 
material, then I asked, if we did, prior to going to the floor, get the 
response from the President to our subpoenas, would we then withdra• 
article III? And he said "Yes." 
Ray, in my remarks to Article III,,.]_~~d t.)aat even if the President V--
stated reasons fer his refusal to ~)!$.our sub~cenas, the evidence 
before the committee even before the releaseof the June 23, '72, transcripts, 
was more than sufficient to find the claim of e~ecutive privil · ege was 
illegitimately ar.d improperly i..'1Voked, not to protect the office of the 
President, but to protect the particular PI:esident frcm the disclosure 
of his personal participation in the obstruction of justice, accordingly 
the President's non-compliance with the subpoenas fonied an integral 
part of Article I and possibly Article II, and rests more soundly there. 
TR - I agree. 
RT - I agree. 
·,-7 - Don't you all think our colleagues in the House are due a great deal of 
c-:-edit - I am t:iinking provincially here, I admit, but even my Republi-
can colleagues from Alabama specifically avoided saying anything critical 
of what I was doing, and they were very strong Nuon fans, and their 
constituencies were. Even a right-winger like Bill Dickenson never 
stated anything like that. You all undoubtedly had about the same ex-
perience. They were unusually kind in terms of the highly charged 
political atmosphere that we were operating in. 
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HF - We all thought that through. That wasn't our job, '.las it? 
RT - That's right. 
HF - It -was always a possibility. 
TR - What we are showing right here now is that we each reached our individual 
decisions differently, and there is nothing wrong rith that. I made up 
my mind, as I told Father Shea, after hearir..g John Dean give direct evidence 
of presidential irrvol vement in what I thought was a very heinous offense 
as far as abuse of power. That influenced me, plus listening to Cates, 
and then taking that summary of information which for the first time, as 
far as I was personally concerned, put everything together so that I could 
form a judgment that the President had indeed lied to the American people, 
and that he had done certain other things that I thought were so serious 
at that point that he should be impeached, at least held to account by the 
Senate. That is what really motivated me • 
,JM - My decision arrived 901, of the way during the time of the oral testimony 
of Dean, Kalmbach, and others, and then the summary helped bolster what 
was then a kind of an emotional feeling, but up until that time I had 
just absolutely refused to let rrr:, ownself consider the possibility. 
WF - I refused myself the luxury of forming an opinion until all of it was in. 
And I way I thought about it, we travelled a long road in which there was 
a stoP< here and a stop there, and after the oral testimony, that was it. 
You know, that was all of our evidence, but the summary was coming later, 
but in my own mind I looked back down the road and there were just too 
many bodies laying around. I didn't necessarily think about one thing 
or none of it; theee was just so damn much there. There was so much 
smoke, there had to be that big, roaring inferno that we kr.ew was there. 
HF - Did any of you think during this process differentially between our task 
and the respor.sibi~ity of the Senate? And of what would result in a 
failure of the Senate to convict? Did any of you thi.l'lk of the possibility 
of being a manager on the part cf the House? 
WC - Ham, let me go back to .something. I came across in m:, notes something 
you probably won't recall. One time you and I were walking out of the 
Rayburn Building, and we were told, I think by Mi.lee Waldman, that the 
Republicans had had a meeting, ar.d I will get the date - we were not ~ 
present at the caucus - where it was suggested that~ Republicans 
should not support impeachment because it was not going to carry in the 
Senate and there would be two years of unmitigated hell for all those 
who voted for impeac~ment to pay, and then you quipped back to Mike at 
that point something to the effect, "Well, hell, you are looking at two 
of the prosecutors in the Senate right now." And Waldman said, "Can I 
quote you en that?" And you broke out in a big laugh. 
HF - We were standing in the horssshoe drive outside, getting into the car, 
and there was Sam Donaldson of ABC there also. I remember his expression 
. ..,hen he said, "Can I quote you?" 
LA UGh"TER. 
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re - Here is one the things that you disagreed on when we talked rith you in-
di vidually. Could there have been a case without the tapes? Now Mr. 
Mann just got thru saying the thing that was most convinci~ to him was 
the oral testimony and so on. Would you direct yourselves to that? 
WC - Without the transcripts, all you had was John Dean versus R::.chard Nixon. 
TR - Yeah. I can speak to that. If we did not have the tapes, here is waht 
I think would have happened: the question of giving imrunit7 to Ehrlichman 
and Haldeman and other witnesses would have been raised. 
WF - Where did you get the evidence even for that? 
TR - I think we had Dean. 
WF - Oh, God! Evidence warranting immu.'l'lit:, for Ehrlichman and P.aldeman came 
from the tapes. 
WC - They lied in theSenate. Does it make any difference if they would now lie 
to us? 
TR - No, what I am saying is, I think it would haYe been a ·,er; difficult case 
frankly, but I think in asking that question, you haYe to assume that we 
would have conducted our L"lquiry much differently. You would have had the 
question whether to call other witnesses. 
WC - That is so removed from reality, ~n terms of what that co:r.:rittee would 
have done. 
TR - Well, it is a difficult question. 
~C - We did not do arry investigation on our part. 
TR - I know that, we already had it. 
WC - But the point is, we were operating under time pressure. You may recall, 
we took the vote - we had to get this thing over by Apri2. er May: "Come 
on, fellows, hth--r-J up. You are dragging your heels on this." We were ✓ 
under tremendous pressure to concl".lde this, quote,~as expeditiously as 
possiblef'and so if we had to conduct our own investigation •••• 
TR - I agree with yuu. 
WF - If you hadn't had the tapes, you ~ould never have had any i.~qui.ry. 
JM - That's right. 
WF - There would never have been any Saturday Night Massac!"e. V:.th no tapes, 
no or.e ~ould have gotten off the ground. You would have had Drir.an's 
reolution flying around, that would have been it. 
HF - I hadn't thought of the question that way. I thought you meant, if we 
hadn't the tapes, did ve have enough evidence otherwi8e? But I see we 
might never have gotten to the initiation of the inquiries. 
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·n - You ain't got the President tho. You got everybody else. ~ou got the 
pay-off, you got Hunt, you got Liddy, you got Bittman, O"Brien, you got 
all those birds, but you ain't got Richard Nixon. 
CB - Going back to what basically Bill said, those guys were tough enough to 
make up their minds that they were not going to tell the truth, and stick 
it out. But they are also tough enough that when they make up their 
minds that the ship is sinking and I had better get off - unload the 
whole way. And I just think in time this thing would have developed and 
come out. 
a 
TR - You need/credible, corroborated informer. 
'n - Another stoolie. 
WC - But we did not have the time. 
CB - 'lihat ·.co you think you could get out of John Ehrlichman today if you promised 
himimmmity? You could get the whole God damned world. I don't know about 
Haldeman. 
WC - That is because he knows you got the stuff. 
HF - Listen to him today - everything is peaches ar.d cream - lo-vel:r people 
in the White House. 
WF - Ehrlichman is working for the Indians in New Mexico or Arizor,..a. 
CB - He figured out we hadn't fleeced the Indians a 1~ yet, but there must 
be some way. 
LAUGHER. 
DS - Under new areas for discussion, does anyone have acomment on t he kind 
of report that came from the Committee? 
WC - I had some complaints about it. I think my initial reaction was that it 
was handled like everything else - we got it at the last moment with 
about 24 or 48 hours to make our comments. And it was a document which 
couldn't even be read in that period of time. we had a very legitimate / 
complaint on our part that we were always getting thing~at the last V 
moment, and without any real opportunity to have ~input. Yuu either 
take it or leave it. "Here it is, fellows, c1nd yoJ.~-,;ot to ~o with it." V--
w7 - When was the final report filed? 
SL - August 20. 
WF - I don't thir.Jc it matters. 
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RT - If you want to justify the charges of history and get ·11mrry::..71g about your 
individual opportunities, I think you are nattering yourself when you 
think anybody would pay any attention to it. I am just glad that John Doar 
took the time to set out the facts, and I am sorry that he did overshoot 
in many instances, but I think his greatest value is in terms of history. 
It was a compilation of a record here that it was not an impeachment 
that was politically motivated, but justifed by the facts. And if the facts 
are a little bit fictitious, that strengthens it in value rather than 
hurts it. 
WC - But those opinions expressed are more important when you get the ten who ~ 
voted against it, saying let's make it clear for history: "~e did not 
drive Richard Nixon out of office. 
CB - Would you modify the use of the word "fictitious" and say "overdra'W?l"? 
RT - Overdrawn, overstated. 
DS - In your absence, Mr. Mann, there just for a mo~ent, I asked the question, 
what were your reactions to the final report of the Committee, and Mooney 
says that you had some at the time. 
TM - He had a lot of input. I think he may have drafted it r 
RT- I had an input on the portion on a__..-t,icle III. 
JM - I'm looking for the conciusion· of the report. 
RT - The ori8-L"1a.l report language did not seem to me to suf.!'iciently establish 
the theory that I tried to articulate, so it was necessary to correct it. 
TR - I'll tell you truthfully that I don't thir.k that the fir.al recort had much 
to do rith this coaltion. °B'f then it was all over. 
CB - My view is the same. As far as I was concerned, I was sated ·rith the whole 
business. 
WF - I was on the banquet circuit trying to explain what I done. 
UUGHTE.-t.. 
WF - I hadn't thought about my next election until about June 27, late in the 
evening, and then I really did. 
Il5 - The second item here is - I have only two very poor copies unfortunately 
- the June 28th letter of David Dennis, concerning tae five minute allow-
ance to all members to question witnesses. Did that play any part in your 
thinking or procedure then? 
RT - Not much. 
CB - I doubt if anybod.7 paid any attention to it. 
DS - Rails had said just then he thought it affected none of your tactics or 
votes. 
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TR - Well sure, he's in jail. 
WC - He said when he was in the A.G.'s office, he had to twist arms to get 
members coming in to serve on that committee, because under the leadership 
of Manny Cellars it really wasn't all that interesting to serve on. 
TR - I disagree. I certainly wouldn't switch. 
HF - That is because Manny Cellars kep the good stuff for his subcommittee, 
you can bet on that. He packed a lot of powe~. 
WC - I wouldn't change either. 
TM - There are periods and trends in this. When the committee was working on 
the Civil Rights Act in 1964, it had the nation's focus, and it was de-
veloping a lot of controversy. It wasn't a prestigious committee, tho. 
However, it is a committee which has a lot of tough political issues, 
the death penalty, abortion, amnesty, gun control, and down the whole list. 
WF - You get the nuts and bolts, you don't get to authorize any money. It is 
a whole lot of tough issues. They might not get you acy votes. 
RT - It was not at all ITT'/ first choice, and I was frustrated in not getting 
my first choice of conmittee assignments, and after I failed to get on 
the appropriations committee, J{ilbur Mills called me arid said, "Well, 
Judiciary is a nice quiet comm:.ttee. You get on there and serve and get 
some experience." 
LAUGHTER. A-1,,.,. ~~\~ 
WC - That's good! Ray, here's how I got on the iciary Cormnittee. This is 
the Harvard influence. I went to that spe 1.al course they had, an ex-
nerimental one for freshman Cong~essmen · 1972. There were f our of 
us, Barbara Jordan, Ivonne Burke and [ '? and rr(Y3el:. And one of the 
people there told me that in selectir.g committees, what you really should 
do if you want to get on a commmittee of your choice is to put all the 
other cnes first, and the one ycu really want last. :Because they think 
if you want that one first, it ~s for sor.~ ulterio~ · motive, and they will 
check you out too close, and you ~on't make it. I put appropriations, 
ways and means, armed services, and judiciary last, hopir~ the strategy 
would work. 
CB - Same as in World War II - Mr. Roberts. 
JM - Let me make one statement here .for the group that I T.ade privately. I was 
not satisfied that the draftil".g ability of the imp'?achment staff was enough 
to write an appropriate summar., or conclusion to a...rticle II en the abuse 
of power. I thought it should be done philosophically and so forth, and 
when expressing that opinion to John Dear, we agreed to call Phil Kurland, 
the professor at the University of Chicago, one of the constitutional 
lawyers of national repute. John Dear seemed to think he was a beteer 
man for the job than Berger or Tom Bickel or Tom Atchinson[?] from Yale. 
So I cal:ed Phil Kurland, but he was just leaving for his home in the 
north woods up in Michigan, and he said he just couldn't do it. So then 
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SD _ fi n holding, on debating each one of those subparagraphs, ar.d it turned 
out to be the best strategy - the best thing that we did, and it is 
,mother of those things that :,ou just slop into as you come along. It 
~urely worked out well. 
•,ff _ "'" were being routed that day, I think. 
c.a _ What I wanted to know, who had a different view-? 
re - 'rhe substantial difference, as I recall, was t .hat there were several of 
you who felt that, no, the morale problem cf the specificity issue was 
not as bad as all that, you were not on the verge of coming apart that 
much, that it was a much calmer sitation than others of you indicated. 
'lif - Well, I think that my- 1110rale problem was that we knew the minds and 
hearts of the people were being lost for our side, that we were losing 
the battle in the public forum, and you know it's going to be a long 
time before it got elevated again to the 1~ Nielson rating, 
r:s - One or the other of you went so far as to really wonder if the thing 
was going to hold together at all. 
• C - My reaction to it was that after nine months •••• 
'!?. -
·,.c -
Bill Cohen is kind of flaky. He was scared to death. 
~'11asn't flaky so much, but just disappointed at what was going on./ 
You had nine months of pregnancy and then you had the birth on tele-
vision, in which SAndman, who said nothing during the entire ni.~e 
months, now was tearing us apart. ,.,Give me an example, g:!.ve me a: 
specific example,'" and not one word was coming out from us. I thought 
we looked like he~. · 
•: - ~e weee letting those other birds handle it, though, and I resolved there 
that the hell with that, let's take charge, we're the ones that had 
·.-c -
3 -
the political exposure, we were the ones that the American p~ople were 
~ol nP, to have confidence in, we were the guys that ~ade the ob j ective 
dnci3ion, and we might as well go on to take charge. What t he hell, 
it •~ just politics. 
I do recall saying that night,"Lock, I'll stay up all night if I have 
t." , but I' 11 write the specifics for article I." And I went on to say 
h,,w we were going to handle that whole thing. But I recall being just 
1 
•1t <tl ly disgusted. Y:eefl, thea ;r:mz 1M1e ~~ w!Ail the lliJIHi. ... ii.ul [:? ] V-
I "" Cnll that rrrJ reaction was one of anger that we ~ let down by the ~ 
~l 4 t'f . w.c.-\... 
►\y l'flaction was one of terror, that we were going to collapse and were 
d ' \ I 11~ to strangle ourselves over specification. 
t5 - Ii I tl l\1 , t the outset of that dinner, Tom [RJ , wasn't your first reaction 
in and say, in a certain sense, yes, we will list with the I 'I t\ IV 
, I I,, \ ~ the various specifics? 
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WC - Do you think it would beneficial if after we corre~t our ve~sions of 
our tape that we share them with the other members? 
D.5 - Perhaps not quite yet, so that not too many copies a:-e fl ea~::~ around. 
CB - After we get it back, then what are you going to do with i ~ :iltimately? 
DS - When I came to t his project in Febr-..iary, and then on the 7t ~ cf May when 
we met for lunch, my frank impressicn was that when we got t hru with tod;ay, 
it would locked up. So I would feel perfectly co::rtent and not at all 
disappointed if nothing else happened to the corrected trar~cripts. But 
I want · to be fran.'I< that among the three of us, there is sore disagree-
ment. Steve feels differently, in other worss, that this should go on, 
so we may take different views on this. My view is that I frankly don't 
care. I am an historian; I think the historical record is essential. 
I'll give myself a little compliment and say that I think what I've done 
so far has gone well, but I am not competent to write a best seller, a 
journalistic sort of thing, that just ain't my area. And I mow this. 
Plus the fact of the time factor: in six weeks I am going to be teaching 
full time again at St. Joseph's College, and this is not goi!-.g to be a 
half-time job for whoever puts it together. This is a ma j o~ job. And I 
am just not going to have the time to devote to this pco j ec~. I'll be 
most willing to help anyone to. Meanwhile, I am goir~ to get the trans-
cripts ready for you by the time you return next month. 
TR - Father, after we correct and edit, I personallY thin.~ you ought to be 
able to do with it whatever you want. I think what we are discussing 
also is whether we want to take part in it. It could be a very, very 
worthwhile thing. Whether it would sell, I don't kno-_r, b1.'t ::i:: do know 
this, there is ::nterest. 
WC - I would like to di rect myself to that , because, 7cm , most c: the me mbers 
know . that I had gi ven strong co:1s:.ceration t o · .... -:-it ::. ,.g a tco:< myself , 
j ust about my o·-m participation, hew I got there, what I pe~ee i ved to be 
the truth, and so forth. I had agreed to do a beck with J im Naughton 
who I think is one of the finest -rr~ters in Washir1o:Tton, ru~d Hho had 
covered the Watergate thing from the Senate side and our s::.de and is 
really a gifted writer. We had written five o~ six chapters actually, 
and I submitted it to a number of publications. I had a lot of 
reservations about this - the timing, and the market is so glutted 
cl:-~ 
tL-
right now with a lot of junk. Frankly, I had given strong consideration 
of not doing anything for several years, ten years, just waiting and 
going back and doing it from~ own notes. And so we just kind of 
pursued this or. an experirrental basis, let us w-:-ite somethi..,g and see 
~Drs1 if there is any interest out there. We contacted most o~ t he ma jor 
outfits, an~ I talked to David Obst specifically II\Y'Self, and he said, 
"Look, it' great idea, but frankly there is no interest in it. The 
market is illed rght now ..... Woodwa...-d and Bernstein~mir!g out,HNixon's 
last fundred pays, Sam Dash is tryi ng to write a boclc. ~t isn't going 
to make it." And I talked to Simon cL~d Shuster, Ferrar Strauss, Little 
Brown, and all said the same things: great material, but we don't think 
it will sell, and we don't want to make any investment." FranklY, I 
t hink it is j ust as well it came out that way, I think this n_a~ get ..,,..,-
t o shake up and settle down, to use your phrase, walter, ~look back 
i n some years. I think it will have more impact from 1 fi'istorical view then. 
